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ABSTRACT 
Nuclear escalation control theory rests on the idea that decision makers, in a limited 
nuclear war scenario, will choose their actions based on a rational assessment of the 
available information. That information essentially consists of intelligence reports about 
one’s adversary and information reporting the status of one’s own forces’ ability to 
execute offensive actions and the damage level of vital national targets. Yet the practical 
limits of managing the flow and quality of this information, coupled with the fog and 
friction inherent in human analyses, significantly affect the decision-making process vis-
à-vis nuclear escalation. Hence, these limitations cast a pall over any military doctrine 
that relies heavily on the assumption that nuclear escalation can be controlled with 
precision. Examining information management during the Cuban Missile Crisis shows 
the practical limits of managing this information flow, which in turn limits the ability of 
national leaders to make such decisions properly. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapon and, in doing so, 
shattered the US nuclear monopoly, nuclear theorists have tried to reconcile existing 
international relations theory with a world that possesses weapons of unprecedented 
power. The power of nuclear weapons, in turn, gave rise to the short-lived doctrine of 
"massive retaliation." This controversial theory, embraced by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, posited that the threat of a devastating nuclear attack could deter any 
military provocation because the sheer destructive potential of such an attack would give 
pause to any potential adversary. 
Massive retaliation, however, quickly found itself challenged by national security 
theorists.  Senior US Army officials in particular took issue with the idea that strategic 
nuclear weapons would so threaten the survival of an adversary that it would refrain from 
offensive actions. Recognizing that there is likely a range of potential conflicts between 
total nuclear war and peace, thinkers pushed for a new conception of military strategy 
that relied on numerous options built around so-called “limited war.”1 
  
 Limited War 
The concept of limited war evolved over the course of several decades.  As 
theorists in the 1960s defined it, individual belligerents exchanged nuclear attacks against 
targets of tactical, operational, and strategic value. These attacks used “strategic or long-
range weapons,” in such a way that is “deliberately and voluntarily limited in the total 
                                               
1  Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1960. p. 27. 
 
 2 
amount of damage threatened, planned, and done as well as in the kinds of targets 
attacked.”2 Such conflicts, in theory, focus on much simpler objectives of much-reduced 
stakes.  
By the conclusion of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, exactly how 
limited those nuclear options proved to be in practice was open to debate.  The US 
military received its policy guidance from the National Strategic Targeting and Attack 
Policy (NSTAP), which identified three core missions for the US strategic forces in the 
event of conflict. The first core task was to destroy both the political leadership and the 
strategic forces located outside of urban areas of both the Soviet Union and China. The 
second task was to destroy the non-urban conventional military capabilities of the Soviet 
Union and China. The third and final task was to destroy those strategic capabilities of 
the Soviet Union and China located within urban areas3. 
These tasks, then, were integrated into the Single Integrated Operations Plan 
(SIOP) as “five attack options against the Soviet Union and other communist countries” 
which included some variations of each targeting task, some of which were pre-emptive 
and some of which were retaliatory4. In addition to these five options, US decision 
makers would be given the ability to exclude, or “withhold” some targets from 
consideration, including exempting certain major targets (such as national capitals), as 
well as individual countries (as an example, the United States could exclude 
                                               
2  Read, Thornton, and Klaus Knorr. Limited Strategic War. New York: Published for the Center 
of International Studies, Princeton University, by Praeger, 1962. p 3. 
3 Kaplan, Fred M. The wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991. 
pp. 267-268 
4 Burr, William. The Nixon Administration, the SIOP, and the Search for Limited Nuclear 
Options, 1969-1974. November 23, 2005. Accessed April 17, 2017. 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/. 
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Czechoslovakia)5. In doing so, then, decision makers would be granted limited options to 
engage in nuclear operations at a level below general war. In doing so, the hope was US 
decision makers would be able to negotiate war termination at a level agreeable to US 
interests. 
At the beginning of the Nixon Administration, however, it was decided that these 
options were insufficient. Aiming to further develop a “broad range of limited options 
aimed at terminating war on terms acceptable to the U.S. at the lowest levels of conflict 
feasible”6 the new policy sought to “control escalation by setting clear boundaries on the 
scale of the attack.”7 As Kissinger would observe during the formulation of this strategy, 
large inflexible options would portend massive destruction, and as such “smaller 
packages will be used to avoid going to larger ones.”8  
This doctrine, later known as the Schlesinger Doctrine9, sought to avoid 
catastrophic damage during a nuclear confrontation by creating smaller and more discrete 
targeting packages, so that a decision maker could engage some finite targets while 
avoiding others, in the hope that the adversary would reciprocate. In this regard, then, the 
emphasis on “limited war” shifted from one of whole-target sets to even smaller options, 
such as “selected economic and military resources of the enemy critical to post-war 
                                               
5 Ibid 
6 US White House. Office of the National Security Advisor. Memorandum for the President 
“Nuclear Policy.” Henry A. Kissinger. January 7, 1974. Office of the President, Washington, 
D.C. 
7 Ibid. 
8 US National Security Council. “Notes on NSC Meeting 14 February 1969.” Washington, D.C. 
9 Garthoff, Raymond L. Detente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to 
Reagan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994. p. 466 
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recovery” or “those enemy military forces which otherwise could exercise internal 
control over…post-attack recovery.”10 
A good example of how these kinds of options would proceed is Exercise ABLE 
ARCHER, a notable Cold War exercise that rehearsed such a limited nuclear war in 
1983.  Exercise planners envisioned that death in the Soviet leadership led to political 
turmoil within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  Yugoslavia, during this chaos, 
turned to the West for financial and military assistance to counteract its stagnating 
economy.  The Soviet Politburo, fearing that Yugoslavia's action might prompt other 
Warsaw Pact nations to abandon the Soviet Union, launched an invasion of Yugoslavia, 
hoping to quell dissent as it had in the Hungarian Revolution and Prague Spring. 
This invasion, however, mobilized NATO.  In response, the Soviet Union then 
invaded Norway, Finland, and Greece. As NATO attempted to repel these attacks, the 
bulk of the Soviet Forces in Germany attacked through the Fulda Gap. The fighting went 
badly for NATO.  After several days of battle, which included air strikes and Army 
Special Forces infiltrations into Crimea, NATO employed a nuclear weapon against a 
target within the Soviet Union. This employment was intended to signal that the NATO 
was willing to escalate the conflict to terminate the conflict, hoping that such a signal 
would persuade the Soviet Union to sue for peace in a manner favorable to NATO. This 
nuclear weapon, targeted against Kiev, marked the conclusion of the exercise (and 
presumably, in the minds of the designers, the limited war)11.  
                                               
10 US Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Nuclear Weapons 
Employment Policy.” 10 April 1974. Washington, D.C. 
11 Houghton, Vince, and Nate Jones. "Able Archer 83: An Interview with Nate Jones · 
SpyCast." Spycast. November 15, 2016. Accessed November 28, 2016. 
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Such limited nuclear conflicts, while obviously more ideal than a general nuclear 
war, are far more subjective and prone to overall misperception.  Indeed, as the Cold War 
continued, there was a recognition that limited war, while better than a general nuclear 
war, was still not an ideal option.  As nuclear theorist Paul Bracken observe in the 1980s:  
 
Some may not like the theory of limited war, especially in its nuclear variety, and 
there is no guarantee that the theory actually will work in practice. Nuclear war 
once begun may escalate to nearly complete levels of national destruction.  For 
this reason, any principles and incentives that indicate a way for a nuclear war to 
end short of these damage levels can be criticized. But having at least some basis 
for believing war could end before massive casualties is better than not having 
any basis for believing this.12 
 
Escalation 
A necessary part of limited war is the concept of “escalation”, or “an increase in 
the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or 
more of the participants…. Escalation can be unilateral, but it is often reciprocal, as each 
combatant struggles ever harder to achieve victory or avoid defeat.”13 US Air Force styles 
this doctrine as “escalation dominance,” namely “the ability to increase the adversaries’ 
cost of defiance while denying them the opportunity to neutralize those costs (e.g., the 
threat of a major increase in the tempo of operations against them).”14  Such an ability 
                                               
https://www.spymuseum.org/multimedia/spycast/episode/able-archer-83-an-interview-with-nate-
jones/. 
12  Carter, Ashton B., John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket. Managing Nuclear 
Operations. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987. p 199. 
13 Morgan, Forrest E. Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2008. 
14  US Department of the Air Force. Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development. 
Practical Design: The Coercion Continuum.  
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requires an understanding of both the “total resolve” and “relative resolve” of the 
participants of a crisis.  A state’s total resolve consists of three key components: 
● Stakes: “Strategic objectives or national interests.”  
● Credible Capabilities: “The relevant factors of time, space, and forces...that 
enhance the perception that escalation is possible.”   
● Risk Tolerance: “Inherent aggressiveness or boldness."  
Relative resolve is “how one actor perceives the other actor’s resolve relative to its own, 
and is calculated as the difference between the challenger’s resolve and the defender’s 
resolve.”15 However, for a decision maker to assess relative resolve requires an 
understanding of each participant's total resolve. Without such an understanding, a 
decision maker may misread the overall situation and select actions that may worsen a 
crisis.  
Such an understanding is often elusive, leading to imperfect decision making.  As 
will be argued hereafter, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, provides a useful 
rubric for understanding the sources of such imperfections. 
 
National Decision-Making 
Escalation requires action on the part of a crisis participant. As such, it is helpful 
to have a methodological framework to understand leadership decision making.  Though 
many models exist, perhaps the most useful for this task is the Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act (OODA) Loop.  
Fighter pilot and military theorist John Boyd created the OODA Loop, which has 
given the loop the alternate name of "The Boyd Loop."  This concept was fleshed out in 
Creation and Destruction, an unpublished paper, as well as in “Discourses on Winning 
                                               
15 Ducharme, Douglas R. "Measuring Strategic Deterrence: A Wargaming Approach." Joint 
Forces Quarterly, July 2016, pp. 40-46. 
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and Losing,” and “Patterns of Conflict,” briefings Boyd created and gave to explain the 
theory to government decision makers. Boyd posits that conflict is a “time-competitive 
cycle” in which both sides attempt to impose their will on their adversary by responding 
to their decision making the fastest.16 
 Imagine a boxer during a prize fight.  In the “Observe” phase, the fighter is 
amassing as much information about his adversary as possible as well as about the ring 
itself.  He might observe what direction his opponent is approaching from, if he is 
favoring one side of his body over the other, where he has his footing, if there is a puddle 
of water in the middle of the ring, etc.  
In the second phase, “Orient,” the boxer pairs his observation of his adversary 
with an understanding of that opponent's background: What is that adversary's fighting 
style? What kind of advice is his coach likely giving him? Is he prone to rash actions if 
pressured? Does he favor a particular kind of punch? This phase is the most critical and 
most difficult of all those in the OODA loop.17 “Orient” cannot be achieved through 
simple modeling or organizational changes; it requires an individual decision maker to 
not only acquire a thorough understanding of the adversary but to reach that 
understanding at an almost unconscious level.  Boyd himself recognized that a potentially 
vast array of factors must be understood to “actually understand” an opponent, including 
such concepts as “cultural traditions”, “previous experiences”, and “genetic heritage”. 18 
The third phase is “Decide”, namely, to settle upon an action to engage the 
adversary.  Taking the information he has gathered about his opponent and the 
                                               
16  Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. p. 5. 
17  Coram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Boston: Little, 
Brown, 2002. pp. 334-335. 
18 Coram, p. 335. 
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environment from the “Observe” phase, and then pairing that with a holistic 
understanding of that adversary in the “Decide” phase, the boxer decides what kind of 
punch to use. Perhaps a right hook would be the best punch to deliver to his opponent 
because that opponent is favoring one side of his body due to blows sustained earlier in 
the fight. Or, the boxer might rely on the knowledge that the gym where the opponent 
trains does a poor job of teaching its boxers on how to defend against such a strike. 
The final phase is “Act”, is where a decision maker carries out the action decided 
upon in the previous phase.  In the context of the ongoing boxing example, the boxer then 
delivers a right hook to his adversary.  Once complete, the cycle begins again, with the 
boxer observing how his opponent responded to the strike and planning his next move 
accordingly.  The goal of the OODA loop is to run through this cycle as quickly and 
efficiently as possible (and, in any case, more efficiently than one's adversary).  Doing so 
allows a decision-maker to better manage the chaos and uncertainty implicit within 
conflict and cause the adversary’s ability to resist to collapse—in effect “out-OODA-ing” 
the adversary.19 
Military historians who are critical of Boyd’s theory, such as Daniel Bolger, argue 
that the theory is overly abstract and idealized.20 Others, like Robert R. Leonard, argue 
that Boyd’s theory is difficult to apply in practice given modern organizational and 
societal constraints.21 Despite these critiques,  as a framework for understanding human 
decision making during a conflict, the OODA-Loop should not be summarily dismissed; 
                                               
19  Polk, Robert B. "A Critique of the Boyd Theory: Is It Applicable to the Army." M.A. thesis, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999.  
20  Daniel P. Bolger, "Maneuver Warfare Reconsidered," in Maneuver Warfare Anthology ed. 
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 21-22. 
21 Polk, p 36. 
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for, although properly moving through the Loop in real time might be difficult to train for 
and accomplish in practice, it can be useful in understanding past decision making or 
hypothetical decision making in the future. 
Information management has a significant role to play within the Boyd Loop, 
both for the “observe” and “orient” phases.  For decision makers to make decisions, they 
require the information needed to make those decisions accurately.  That information 
must be collected, selected for relevance, properly analyzed, and transmitted to proper 
decision makers.  Yet as military theorists have observed for centuries, this process of 
information management is not perfect. Information that is incorrect, misunderstood, or 
simply absent is a constant fixture of warfare. Writing in 1832, in the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars, Carl von Clausewitz observed that: 
 
If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to the 
region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three 
quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of 
greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called 
for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.22 
 
 
 
This “fog” is where the “fog of war” concept has its roots. The fog of war posits 
that “[w]ar is inherently volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.”23 In doing so, it 
asserts that commanders are not omniscient. As one analyst attempting to capture the 
essence of the problem remarked: 
 
“Whether he is a rookie fighter pilot, a silver-haired fleet admiral, or an aging 
politician, the commander of a military force wants to know more than [he or she] 
                                               
22 Von Clausewitz, Carl, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret. On war. Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 
1991. p. 101 
23 Kiesling, Eugina C. ""On War: Without the Fog"." Military Review, Sept. & Oct. 2001, 85-
87. 
 10 
usually gets told about the enemy. Commanders in the field, whether of an army 
or an airplane, generally also want to know more about the environment - 
weather, for example, or the relevant terrain. Finally, much as it pains a 
bureaucracy like an armed service to admit it, a commander often lacks the ability 
to get [his or her] own organization to report adequately about its own status to 
carry out [his or her] orders. Even in an Army of smokeless powder and ball 
bearings, the fog and friction of war dominate the battlefield and make the 
vanquished easy prey for armchair historians[.]”24 
 
Human conflict, then, is enshrouded in this fog. From the platoon leader 
attempting to maneuver his unit onto an objective to the commander of a carrier battle 
group attempting to maneuver his force into position for a strike, commanders must 
analyze their situation, make the best decision he or she is able and have that decision 
carried out despite the gaps in their overall understanding of a situation. Nuclear 
escalation control is not exempt from this; it too must contend with the fog of war.  
At its heart, the fog of war is a problem of information management. As such, we 
must understand the dynamics of that information management to judge how effectively 
it can overcome the fog of war. A key aspect of information management is intelligence 
collection. During escalation management, there are three key intelligence functions.  
First, decision makers require “intelligence warning,” which is the “process of 
communicating judgments about threats to US security or policy interests to decision-
makers.”25 Second, decision makers must have a clear "situational awareness," or the 
understanding of the enemy situation, consisting both of where an adversary is physical 
located and of what capabilities the adversary has at its disposal.   Decision makers must 
also have a clear vision of their opponents as human beings as opposed to mere 
                                               
24 Setear, J. K. Simulating the Fog of War. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1989. p. 1 
25 Mary McCarthy, “The National Warning System: Striving for an Elusive Goal,” Defense 
Intelligence Journal 3 (1994). 
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abstractions and, on that basis, consider what, namely what they might actually intend to 
do and how they might actually react to any action taken by decision makers. 
Yet the fog of war demonstrates that gulf exists between limited war in theory, 
and limited war in practice. Examining the information management during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis shows the practical limits of managing this information flow limit the 
ability of national leaders to make such decisions properly. Using the Cuban Missile 
Crisis as a vehicle to study the analytic pathologies that can affect information 
management, it will examine: 
● Collection Failure. Critical information is missed by the intelligence 
community. Such oversights can come from the sheer volume of available 
information, due to a technical fault or oversight, or simply due to deliberate 
obfuscation by an adversary. It can also result from human errors in operating 
intelligence collection equipment or from equipment malfunctions, resulting 
in the presentation of false data for analysts.  
● Analytic Bias. Information can be misinterpreted, misused, or dismissed due 
to existing preconceptions on the part of both analysts and decision makers, 
and overly granular reports given in parallel can often fail to provide decision 
makers with the proper understanding of the situation that could have been 
achieved by combining them into a more holistic assessment, resulting in an 
analytic failure. 
● Vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence (C4I) Infrastructure. The delicate networks and facilities required 
for passing information and making assessments for decision makers are finite 
and vulnerable to destruction; and overreliance upon such systems can, in the 
case of their major disruption or destruction, render impossible the task of 
analyzing incoming information, making decisions, and transmitting those 
decisions to the proper recipients. 
 
The following chapters will address each of these concepts.  Chapter 2 will 
explore collection failure in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, determining why 
information that could have allowed the United States to escalate while the Soviet 
Union’s total resolve was low was not detected.  It will examine the challenges facing 
 12 
analysts and decision makers caused by large information volume, and adversary denial 
and deception activities, and errors in collection and information management equipment. 
Chapter 3 will explore the various analytic biases that compounded the collection 
failures during the Cuban Missile Crisis and nearly led to fatal misjudgments about 
Soviet resolve. These analytic failures include poor analytic tradecraft on the part of 
intelligence analysts as well as bureaucratic interference on the part of intelligence 
managers and the senior advisors surrounding decision makers. 
Chapter 4 will explore how the vulnerable C4I Infrastructure would have made 
effective decision making during an escalation difficult, due to the destruction of 
infrastructure critical to that decision making.  This vulnerable infrastructure can be 
broken down into three distinct types: communications infrastructure, analytical 
infrastructure, and command facilities. 
Finally, Chapter 5 will explore how the problems in the previous three chapters 
not only remain relevant today but have become far worse. Advances in technology, 
often thought of as the cure-alls to problems within government, are double-edged 
swords:    Just as much as technology relieves problems, it also exacerbates them. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is a frequently used case study, in part because of the 
wealth of available documents.  It is entirely possible that other crisis periods, such as the 
1983 Soviet War Scare, may have brought the world closer to war than the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and that historians lack access to the same amount of classified materials to 
confirm this assessment. In any case, the Cuban Missile Crisis offers remarkable insights 
concerning limited nuclear escalation control that remain applicable today. 
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2. COLLECTION FAILURE 
 
 Because it is typically thought of by many analysts and observers as the key 
intelligence requirement within escalation control, “warning” consumes much of the 
intelligence community’s time and resources. At a minimum, the ability to detect that an 
attack is in progress has been a core mission of the nuclear enterprise for almost its 
entirety of its existence. Warning is the “process of communicating judgments about 
threats to US security or policy interests to decision-makers.”26 Warning is divided into 
three distinct types.  “Strategic Warning” is looking out to the “distant future” and is 
primarily used to identify emerging threats to national security.  “Operational warning” is 
more granular and seeks to “identify indicators that an attack is in preparation.” Finally, 
“tactical warning” exists to serve as the “immediate alerting function” that a specific 
attack is underway.27 
To better understand the differences in the three kinds of warning, consider the 
familiar example of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  Strategic 
Warning indicators would have included growing Japanese belligerence and the fact that 
their reliance on supplies of oil were vulnerable to US embargo.  Operational warning 
indicators would have included the Japanese assembling a carrier task force and 
submarines and moving them toward Pearl Harbor.  Tactical warning would have been 
the actual sightings of Japanese strike aircraft flying from their aircraft carriers and 
towards the island. 
                                               
26 McCarthy. 
27  Cooper, Jeffrey R. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence 
Analysis. Washington, DC.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005. p. 16. 
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During the Cuban Missile Crisis, strategic and operational warning proved elusive 
for three primary reasons: 
 
1.  Information volume, namely that the information collected was so voluminous as to 
overwhelm analysts.   
2.  Robust Soviet denial and deception, or actions by the Soviet Union which served to 
obscure much of the signs that a significant movement was underway.   
3.  Collection errors resulting from equipment needed for intelligence collection not 
working as intended, either due to mechanical failure or misuse by its operators.  
 
Information Volume  
Cuba had become a rapidly denied environment for intelligence collection, one 
where the intelligence community had little in the way of taskable assets.  Especially 
after the failed Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency rapidly found 
itself with few agents that could be tasked to find answers to specific intelligence queries 
from analysts.  The CIA maintained two major intelligence networks inside Cuba, known 
as “AMTORRID” and “COBRA.”  AMTORRID was located in the Cuba’s eastern 
Oriente Province, while COBRA operated in the western Pinar del Rio Province.  These 
networks were primarily focused on paramilitary operations aimed at sabotage, and 
though ran several dozen subagents and claimed to have over 2,000 informants28. 
Because of a lack of taskable agents in key positions, the CIA was forced to rely 
upon debriefing the flood of middle-class refugees fleeing Cuba. By October, 1962, 
approximately 155,000 Cuban refugees were registered at the Cuban Refugee Center in 
Miami, Florida29. Many of these refugees had no formal military training and did not 
                                               
28.  Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink 
of Nuclear War. p. 122. 
29  Thomas, John F. "Cuban Refugees in the United States." International Migration Review 1, 
no. 2 (1967): 46. doi:10.2307/3002808.  
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know what to look for to detect significant military activities.  In the month of 
September, 1962 alone, CIA debriefers interviewed 882 refugees, most arriving on the 
daily Pan American Airlines flight that flew from Havana to Miami.30 The sheer volume 
of individuals to debrief provided analysts a flood of intelligence reporting.  This flood of 
information proved to be a significant resource drain.  Before 1962, only four analysts 
staffed the Miami debriefing station.  It was only on 15 March 1962 that an expanded 
station opened, which would be capable of handling up to 150 interrogations per day.  
Before this, the lack of debriefers likely resulted in missing vital information relevant to 
Cuba. 
Writing about debriefing procedures in 1963, a CIA analyst observed that even 
standardized questionnaires did not exist, and consequently interrogators had to spend 
considerable amounts of time performing multiple rewrites and clarifications, and 
resolving duplicated data entries before the report could be sent to analysts at CIA 
headquarters.31  
Further, another CIA interrogator, also writing in 1963, observed that one of the 
major limitations of intelligence collection in Cuba was that analysts and interrogators 
were kept separate.  As such, when interrogation reports reached analysts, any follow-on 
questions would be delayed until the interrogator or case officer working that defector 
could ask the question.  In fact, the first joint debriefings did not take place until spring of 
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1963, further delaying the proper exploitation of on-the-ground intelligence coming from 
Cuba.32 
The interrogation guide issued to assist in interrogations in February, 1962, attests 
to just how much data individual analysts were attempting to sift through to make sense 
of events on the ground in Cuba. Comprising over 120 pages of questions, the Army 
interrogators performing initial refugee screening were required to ask about topics 
ranging from political developments, economic growth, militia development, 
infrastructure construction, and security force dispositions.  Of all these questions, only 
two pertained to missile deployments.  Worse, those questions were so general that they 
applied to any missile system, from short-range artillery rockets to surface-to-air missile 
sites.33 
The US government also lacked the ability to manage the volume of information 
that would have come with a US military attack on Cuba or a preemptive Soviet attack on 
the United States. Once US forces were alerted to take part in a potential attack on Cuba, 
scores of US units began to flow to assembly areas within Cuba. The overall commander 
of the new invasion joint task was General Hamilton H. Howze, the commanding officer 
of the XVIII Airborne Corps.  The selection of General Howze came from the pre-
existing plan for an invasion of Cuba, OPLAN 316-62, which specified that the 
commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps was to become the joint task force commander.  
General Howze, however, had been sent by President Kennedy to command Army and 
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National Guard forces assigned restore order in Mississippi after race riots broke out due 
to the desegregation of the University of Mississippi.34 
In order to facilitate the establishment of staffs required to handle the flow of 
information coming in through military channels while also not tipping off either the 
press or Soviet intelligence that an operation was underway, it was necessary to relieve 
General Howze as commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and place him in command 
of a new organization.  Operations in Mississippi also complicated the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff's attempt to track the situation.  The Joint War Room (JWR) in the Pentagon was in 
use monitoring the operation in Mississippi; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staff 
officers had to split the facilities and their communication systems, further complicating 
the flow of information.35 
As the ad-hoc force preparing for operations in Cuba began to assemble, 
shortages in available staff officers became acute. Officers were borrowed from existing 
headquarters from across their respective services.  These officers had never worked with 
each other before, and no established procedures existed. Air Force targeting officers, 
essential for targeting during air operations, were in particularly short supply.  These 
officers worked 15-hour shifts seven days per week.36  
Such shortages were only made worse by a lack of proper intelligence processing 
equipment. Photo reconnaissance machinery, in particular, was scarce. Such scarcity 
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made tracking Soviet movements for targeting purposes difficult and was only made 
worse by the massive influx of intelligence information arriving on an hourly basis37. 
Given the (fortunate) fact that the contemplated US military operation never took 
place, it is hard to fully project how effective information flows during the operation 
would have gone.  However, several historical reference points provide useful insights: 
Since the conclusion of the Second World War, twenty-five percent of all military 
occupational specialties (MOS) categories within the Army were dedicated to combat 
troops.  The rest of these MOS were dedicated to supporting functions, to include 
communications, staff work, intelligence, and command and control operations.  By 
1963, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, this percentage had fallen to 14 percent.38 
This growth in non-combat MOS was to support the increasing automation and 
complexity required in managing military operations as more advanced systems, 
particularly communication systems, entered into service. By 1963, the message traffic 
needed to control US formations was twenty times larger than that of 1945.39  The growth 
of communications systems is also reflected in the growth of communication sources 
during the Vietnam War.  At the division level alone, radio communications jumped from 
eight channels during the Korean War to thirty-two channels in 1963.40 One-quarter of 
MOS were dedicated to communications-related functions.41  At the national level, the 
amount of information flowing into the intelligence community through technical means 
was also extensive. The Cunningham Report, a 1966 CIA Inspector General Report, 
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concluded that the flow of information from collection assets was overwhelming 
intelligence analysts.  “[W]e have come to realize that [analysts] are not the driving force 
behind the flow of information.  Rather, the real push comes from the collectors 
themselves, particularly the operations of large, indiscriminating technical collection 
systems.”42 Simply put, both management and analysts were simply unable to keep pace 
with the rapid influx of information.43  
Sandwiched between WW II and Vietnam, both of which experienced the 
formidable collection and data management challenges described above, one finds the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The vast amount of reporting continued to challenge CIA analysts 
after Soviet missile forces were detected in October. A key assignment for intelligence 
analysts was to determine if nuclear warheads were present in Cuba, and if so, the 
number and location of those warheads. The main intelligence source for this information 
was imagery intelligence, both from high-altitude U2 spy-planes as well as low-level RF-
8 Crusaders or RF-101 Voodoos.44 
 Aerial reconnaissance detected the presence of Soviet nuclear warhead 
transport vans on 23 October. These vans were easily identifiable, both due to 
the large doors at the rear of the van and the prominent air vents to the cargo 
compartment's front. Aerial reconnaissance then detected specialized crane 
vehicles on 25 October at another facility.  These cranes are specially 
designed for safely loading and unloading the hefty nuclear warheads from the 
transport vehicles. The two together are key for the maintenance and handling 
of nuclear warheads.45  
 Additional American surveillance assets determined that the cargo ship 
Aleksandrovsk, which had arrived in Cuba, had departed the Soviet Union 
from a nuclear submarine base located in the Kola Peninsula.  No civilian 
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cargo vessel had been observed visiting this port, and the facility was known 
as a major nuclear warhead storage depot46.  
 
These three pieces of intelligence were crucial for determining that nuclear 
warheads were present in Cuba. Yet CIA analysts did not combine the two photos, as 
well as the information about the Aleksandrovsk, until January 1963, a full three months 
after the crisis.  Further, analysts only made this discovery because overhead surveillance 
had detected the warhead vans as Cuban and Soviet stevedores loaded the Aleksandrovsk 
during the Soviet withdrawal in November 196247.  
Additionally, the Soviet Union had also moved two tactical nuclear delivery 
systems into Cuba.  The first of these was the Luna, a short-range artillery rocket capable 
of carrying a 2-kiloton nuclear warhead out to a range of 25 miles48.  The other was the 
FKR, an early cruise missile.  This system was capable of carrying a 14-kiloton warhead. 
Soviet forces brought eighty of these warheads to Cuba49.  These weapons were intended 
to attack the US facility at Guantanamo Bay, located in eastern Cuba. Yet, despite US 
intelligence tracking the movement of these weapons, it was not assessed that they would 
be used in a nuclear role50. In fact, US intelligence remained ignorant of the presence of 
the nuclear warheads for these systems until the 1990s.51 
Had the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated, American planners would have needed to 
gauge the effectiveness of their operations against Soviet targets.  After all, if the intent 
of a limited war is to inflict sufficient damage to an enemy, it would be necessary to 
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identify targets of reasonable value.  For example, if a decision maker wished to inflict 
damage onto industrial targets to compel an adversary to surrender, then it would be 
necessary to understand which industrial targets were important to that adversary and 
which industrial targets were comparatively unimportant.  A tank factory in Nizhny Tagil 
is not of the same importance as a shoe factory outside of Omsk. 
Such assessments, however, require massive effort.  For the NSA and its 
forerunners, the cornerstone of economic analysis was the traffic that was available to it 
via civilian radio links. Because it was unencrypted, it was easy to both collect and 
translate.  Analysts then attempted to piece together details about the state of the Soviet 
economy52. 
Working from clues as tenuous as a list of Gosbank account numbers that analysts 
were able to link to Soviet defense industries, [the NSA] issued reports 
identifying centers of munitions production, assessing the capacity of the Soviet 
transportation system, estimating the output of vehicle assembly and engine 
plants, and compiling basic production statistics for steel, chemicals, oil, and 
electrical power.53  
 
But since this radio traffic required the monitoring of all civilian communications 
within the Soviet Union, the amount of information was voluminous.  This analysis was 
able to exploit approximately only 0.3 percent of all intercepted messages.54  This 
statistic demonstrates two things:  the sheer volume of information that analysts had to 
exploit on a daily basis, and how much human effort must be expended to analyze the 
information needed to identify key trends and locate critical targets. 
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Information Denial and Deception  
The mission of analysts was made additionally difficult due to the elaborate denial 
and deception measures taken by Soviet planners in preparing for the movement into 
Cuba.  
The operation name selected by the Soviet General Staff, “ANADYR,” is 
indicative of the efforts taken to obscure the nature of the movement should it have been 
compromised.  The Anadyr is a river that empties into the Bering Sea at the extreme east 
of Russia.  The intent behind this was to create the impression that the troops and missiles 
moving to Cuba, if compromised by an intelligence leak, would appear to be moving to 
Russia's Pacific Coast.  To further the deception, the Soviet General Staff provided the 
units with snow equipment such as skis, heavy clothing, and sleds. Such clothing was 
suited to the arctic conditions in the Soviet Union’s east.55 
Loading equipment onto ships for transport to Cuba was also the subject of 
extensive denial and deception measures.  Individuals from the ministry responsible for 
cargo vessels were not authorized to know what operation was underway.  They were 
neither permitted to know the ships contents nor their destination.  To plan the loads for 
individual ships, an official from the Soviet Merchant Marine only knew the weight and 
dimensions of each piece of equipment.  Upon receiving this information, that official 
then planned the individual loads.56 
During equipment loading, the individual troops assigned to a given transport 
were locked down at the port upon arrival and forbidden from communicating with the 
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outside world.  Couriers hand-delivered all orders and ships were loaded only during 
periods of darkness. Once an individual ship was ready to leave port, its captain was 
ordered to proceed to a point in the open ocean, at which point he would be allowed to 
open a set of sealed orders that ordered the ship to Cuba.57  
Disciplined security efforts continued during the journey.  Equipment was stacked 
on the deck so as to make the ships appear to be carrying agricultural or construction 
equipment. Larger pieces of equipment were hidden by erecting false superstructures and 
flooring on the vessel to obscure the cargo.  Hidden defensive armaments were installed 
in such a way as to ensure that they could be used by the ship and its occupants should 
they come under attack during the journey. Sensitive equipment was placed into lined 
containers that were resistant to thermal imaging.58  Soviet soldiers were required to 
remain below decks during the voyage except at night, and even then, they were only 
allowed onto the deck for short periods of time.  This rule was enforced in spite of the 
heat and the lack of any climate controls below. To ensure that they were not detected 
upon arrival and identified as combat troops, soldiers were issued civilian clothing to 
wear.  The intent behind this was to give the soldiers the appearance of being civilian 
technicians dispatched to help develop Cuba's economy. 
Upon arrival in Cuba, the denial and deception campaign continued.  The 
unloading of the cargo vessels took place under tight security.  Unloading of the heavy 
equipment and missiles occurred during periods of darkness to prevent their discovery. 
Equipment, whenever possible, remained crated. Convoys carrying the cargo also took 
place during periods of darkness. 
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Such denial and deception operations were largely successful.  The CIA, reporting 
on the buildup, assessed on 20 August that while their sources indicated that there was a 
growing presence of Soviet advisors, “there is no evidence of organized Soviet military 
units, as such, being included”. Though reports coming from Cuba indicated the 
unloading of sophisticated electronics, the CIA assessed that the cargo was either 
“increased technical assistance to Cuban industry and agriculture and/or the Cuban 
Armed Forces” or the “possible establishment of Soviet COMINT-ELINT facilities 
targeted against Canaveral and other important US installations.”59  
Additional collection sources, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), were denied 
not just by the precautions taken by Operation ANADYR, but also by Soviet 
communications security protocol.  From the Second World War to 1948, US signals 
intelligence had been able to intercept and decrypt large amounts of Soviet government 
communications traffic due to poor wartime communications measures. On Monday, 1 
November 1948, The Soviet Union changed all of its communications security protocols, 
to include changing codes, encryption devices, and operational procedures.  Known as 
“Black Monday” within the NSA, the net effect of this change was to deprive the US 
SIGINT enterprise of all SIGINT sources.60 
The change in communications security across the Soviet Union had significant 
implications for the US SIGINT enterprise.  Without access to these communications, the 
NSA was forced to rely other sources of SIGINT.  The NSA was still able to comb 
through the Soviet Union's internal civilian radio links, which were not subject to the 
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same security requirements. Though this intelligence offered answers for some 
intelligence questions (such as the state of the Soviet economy), it was not helpful in 
building the robust intelligence warning that would have been useful during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.61 
 
Collection Error  
Error too can result in faulty information reaching decision makers. Human actors 
from intelligence analysts all the way to the national decision makers themselves can 
mistake mundane information as ominous, or miss ominous information entirely.  
Technical failures can either produce false indications or cause analysts miss real ones. 
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the sudden arrival of nuclear-capable missiles in 
Cuba seriously complicated the ability of the intelligence community to provide tactical 
warning to the President.  Previously, the main threat from Soviet Missiles had been an 
attack that crossed the Arctic Circle, moving down against the United States from the 
north.  With the installation of missile systems inside Cuba, however, the United States 
found itself with significant gaps in radar coverage. Though radar systems might be able 
to pick up some indications of a launch, it would be impossible to do so with any 
accuracy until it was too late.62 
What radar coverage did exist was itself prone to error.  On 27 October, the 
tracking equipment installed at a radar tracking station in Moorestown, N.J. reported that 
an inbound ballistic missile from the Gulf of Mexico.  The trajectory for that missile 
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contact made it appear that its target was US invasion forces staged in Tampa, Florida. 
After a short amount of time, operators determined that a training program had been 
inadvertently run, creating the illusion of an incoming attack.63 
The increasing of alert statuses also has the effect of making false alarms more 
likely due to the lack of familiarity with systems and rarely rehearsed processes.  
Compounding this lack of familiarity is the fact many of the service members involved 
likely had not worked with each other in any enduring capacity at all. At 1:00 a.m. on 26 
October, a sentry guarding an air defense command center in Duluth, Minnesota detected 
what he believed to be an intruder attempting to scale the fence. Believing the facility to 
be an important-enough target to make an attack by Soviet saboteurs likely, the sentry 
fired several shots at the figure, and then triggered the bases intruder alarm.64 
In responding to this alarm, the night staff at the Duluth command center ordered 
all interceptors under their command to “flush,” meaning they would take off from their 
fields and await further instructions in the ground. One group of these interceptors, which 
were carrying nuclear-armed air-to-air missiles, was operating out of a temporary base at 
Volk Field.  Due to the ad hoc nature of the field, the crews mistook the “flush” alarm for 
a “scramble” order.  Due to the growing amount of ice and snow at Volk Field, the 
aircrews assumed that the scramble order was genuine, reasoning that they would not be 
asked to take off under such hazardous conditions for anything other than an imminent 
attack.65 
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These fighters were preparing to proceed down the runway before being stopped. 
The “intruder” in Duluth was later determined to have been most likely a hungry bear 
scaling the fence to scavenge for food. 
 
Summary 
Intelligence collection, like all human endeavors, is not perfect. It must be 
administered by human, using systems built by humans, and against other humans.  As 
such, these processes are prone to mistakes.  Mistakes of those seen in the illustrations 
above would not suddenly disappear in the case of a conflict perceived to be escalating 
toward even a limited nuclear dimension. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, information 
was voluminous.  Such volume made missing certain key information possible.  Such 
collection would have only increased should the situation have escalated to the use of 
either conventional or nuclear weapons. 
As in all things surrounding human conflict, one’s adversary gets a say in the how 
the proceedings develop.  In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, extensive denial and 
deception techniques were used by the Soviet Union to reduce the amount of time US 
decision makers would have to react to their actions.  Deception operations had long been 
a fixture in Soviet military operations dating back to the Russian Civil War and was a 
core part of Soviet operations during the Second World War.  
Finally, the equipment used to collect intelligence were not perfect and could 
experience technical faults. Further, operators could use the equipment improperly.  Such 
occurrences almost gave inaccurate warning that an attack was underway, potentially 
pressuring President Kennedy into escalating unnecessarily.  It is also likely such errors 
would have persisted during an armed escalation. 
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It is in this way, then, that the fog of war influenced information management 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Had the crisis escalated to military conflict, President 
Kennedy would have attempted to use the information being presented to him, processed 
through his understanding of the situation, to determine which military actions to take to 
terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its interests. To achieve 
optimal results during this process, Kennedy would have required the most accurate 
information possible. Yet as we can see, the potential for collection failure would have 
denied much of that necessary information to Kennedy. 
Many of these same issues remain today, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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3. ANALYTIC BIAS 
 
Analytic bias is the result of the information being collected being processed by 
the intelligence community in such a way as to present a false view of reality for decision 
makers.  This can occur in two key ways: 
 
1.  Barriers to perfect analytic tradecraft, which results in intelligence 
information collected being misinterpreted or dismissed outright, most often 
due to preconceptions on the part of intelligence analysts.   
2.  Bureaucratic interference can influence how intelligence is presented to 
decision makers. This occurs when individuals within the government 
misconstrue intelligence analysis or even outright refuse to accept or analysis 
as it is presented. This can be because they are attempting to achieve a 
particular political objective or personal information to or out of personal 
bias. It could also be simply because they incorrectly believe the intelligence 
to be incorrect. 
 
It is worth noting that while the term bias carries with it certain implications, bias 
does not by itself imply malign or nefarious intent. As the Aristotle observed, humans are 
by their very nature political animals. “Nature,” he writes, “which makes nothing idly or 
without purpose, has equipped them with speech, which enables them to communicate 
moral concepts such as justice which are formative of the household and city-state.”66 As 
such, even when consciously attempting to strike a neutral position, humans often act 
with agendas without even consciously realizing it. This bias can simply be a matter of 
the intelligence community, as an institution, wanting to make their customers happy. 
Andrew Liepman, the former deputy director of the National Counterterroism Center, put 
it this way: 
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In my job, my audience was pretty limited. You could say that I was producing 
(crafting) products for one guy, which was the President. It’s really not as simple 
as that, we had the Congress and the cabinet, but essentially if we wrote 
something and the President thought it valuable “we win,” and that all of our 
ratings go through the roof. And yet we had to be really careful. The President is a 
pretty alluring audience. You can get sucked into that, by the power of the White 
House, and you have to be really careful. We have a saying, “telling truth to 
power is our job.” You don’t want to tell the President what he wants to hear, you 
want to tell him what he needs to hear.67 
 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis shows many of these same dynamics at work. This 
analytic bias resulted in President Kennedy being presented with inaccurate information 
both during the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as throughout that crisis’ 
duration. As we will see, the results of that bias would have had significant impacts on 
the outcome of any escalation.  
 
Barriers to Perfect Analytic Tradecraft  
Even when reports from Cuba began to filter into the intelligence community, the 
collection and analysis process was compromised by both analytic failures on the part of 
the CIA as well as the persistent manipulation (and outright rejection) of intelligence by 
individual decision makers. The massive amount of reporting coming in from refugee 
sources permitted analysts to “cherry-pick” their data to push “whatever hypothesis was 
most fashionable at the time.”68 A National Intelligence Estimate, of 19 September 1962 
assessed that the “establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which 
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could be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently 
estimate it.”69  
CIA analysts made a series of assumptions about Soviet decision making that 
were unfounded.  Those unfounded assumptions then affected the assessments made 
about Soviet intentions and actions in Cuba. A special national intelligence estimate from 
12 September 1962, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” provides an insight into these 
assumptions. Arguing from the outset that the USSR valued Cuba primarily for its 
political value, the analysts argue that: 
 
...the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the 
Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be 
a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.  The 
Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro’s defensive 
capabilities and by threatening military retaliation. At the same time, they 
evidently realize that the deployment of an offensive military base in Cuba might 
provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.70 
 
Discussing the ongoing buildup, which by this point had already seen the delivery 
of ballistic missiles and warheads, CIA analysts mused that the placement of short-range 
surface-to-surface missiles may occur but was not yet happening. Arguing that there 
would be a military utility to the deployment of larger systems, the Soviet Union would 
not do so since “it would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in 
US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far”. 
When reports began to flow in that ballistic missiles were being delivered to 
Cuba, analysts dismissed the sightings as ordinary surface-to-air missiles.  Other 
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observers, to include those from other Western countries such as the United Kingdom, 
skeptically dismissed reports of missiles, commenting that such reports were “wildly 
improbable”.71 Further, despite the vast amount of data flowing in, there continued to be 
certain intelligence gaps created due to a lack of assets on the ground. Such gaps led to 
analysts having to make intuitive assumptions. In attempting to determine which military 
facilities were Soviet and which were Cuban, intelligence analysts often used sporting 
facilities.  If a facility contained a baseball pitch, it was assumed to be Cuban, due to the 
popularity of the sport on the island.  If a facility included a soccer pitch, it was believed 
to be Soviet, since analysts assumed Russians did not play baseball. Additionally, photo 
analysts attempted to determine what kinds of units were at a given site by staring at the 
gardens at each garrison, believing that Soviet units would try to recreate their regimental 
crests using different kinds of flowers.72 While these assumptions seemed sound, Cubans 
did in fact play soccer.  Additionally, flower arrangements could just as easily be the 
product of a local gardener’s imagination. 
As the United States increasingly leaned towards a military attack, analysts 
attempted to determine if nuclear warheads had arrived in Cuba and if so where those 
warheads were stored.  If a military action were intended to destroy the Soviet military 
force in Cuba, finding those sites would be essential. This effort, however, was a failure, 
mainly due to preconceptions about how Soviet nuclear forces stored their nuclear 
weapons. 
As early as 1960, the CIA had observed the construction of two concrete bunkers 
near the town of Bejucal in western Cuba.  The bunkers were constructed to be “blast 
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resistant” and were secured by a single chain-link fence. As the crisis continued, U2 
overflights of the facility were augmented by low-level flights by Navy reconnaissance 
aircraft, which served to provide more detailed photos of the complex, none of which 
showed any significant changes. Another facility, this one located in Managua, was also 
photographed. This facility too also had a single fence surrounding several bunkers 
similar to those at Bejucal73. 
CIA analysts, examining the photos, dismissed both these facilities as being 
possible storage facilities for nuclear warheads: “We were told to look out for multiple 
security fences, roadblocks, [and] extra layers of protection. We did not observe any of 
that” one CIA analyst observed later74. Instead, the CIA focused on a former sugar port at 
Punta Gerardo, near Havana.  This facility had an all the visible signatures of a nuclear 
facility, including a large guard force and the highly-visible double-fence arrangements 
that were standard to Soviet nuclear storage sites inside Russia. 
The CIA analysts were wrong. Bejucal and Managua, despite lacking the obvious 
hallmarks associated with Soviet nuclear warhead storage sites, were actually home to all 
the nuclear warheads in Cuba.  Bejucal stored 36 nuclear warheads for the strategic 
rocket forces, while Managua stored all the tactical warheads allocated for repelling an 
American invasion. Punta Gerardo was a temporary storage location for missile fuel that 
lay in between the loading docks at Mariel and the missile sites at Guanjay75.  
Soviet forces, upon their arrival in Cuba, had struggled to find proper storage 
facilities for their warheads. Though CIA analysts assumed that the primary consideration 
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for a warhead storage facility was security, the main Soviet concern in Cuba was meeting 
the safety requirements for storing warheads and preserving operational secrecy. Colonel 
Sergei Romanov, principally in charge of the transport and care of all nuclear warheads 
assigned to the operation, had selected the site for three reasons:   
First, the facility had an underground parking area that would allow for the 
loading and unloading of essential equipment away from the prying eyes of overhead 
reconnaissance aircraft. Second, the facility best met the physical requirements mandated 
for the storage of nuclear warheads.  Warheads had to be stored in a facility that was at 
least one-thousand square feet, allowing enough space to store each warhead at least 
twenty inches away from any other warhead.  Third, safety regulations also mandated 
strict climate conditions for nuclear warheads.  The temperature in a storage facility could 
not exceed 68 degrees Fahrenheit, and the humidity could not exceed 70 percent.  The 
facilities at Bejucal and Managua were small enough to allow Romanov to properly use 
what few climate control systems he could scavenge from the Cubans to keep the storage 
site at these conditions.76 
 
Bureaucratic Interference 
Once indications began to appear that Soviet missile deployments were underway, 
officials within the Kennedy Administration actively interfered with collection and 
analysis efforts.  The CIA's failed Bay of Pigs invasion had left a poor taste in the mouth 
of many within the Administration, and that colored their responses to Cuban 
intelligence.  John McCone was selected as CIA Director in 1961, a decision that made 
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more liberal officials within the Kennedy Administration suspicious.  McCone was a 
Republican and had earned a reputation in previous postings as a strident anti-
Communist, which many administration officials interpreted as coloring his 
perceptions.77 
McCone believed that the installation of surface-to-air missiles within Cuba was a 
sure sign that ballistic missiles were soon to follow.  Why install such advanced air 
defense systems, he reasoned, unless they had something correspondingly valuable to 
protect?  Yet other analysts within the intelligence community, as well as Kennedy 
Administration officials, were quick to push back against this assessment.  Within the 
CIA, the Director of the Board of Estimates, Sherman Kent, observed that his “intuitive 
case” flew in the face of estimates from the US Intelligence Board and the senior 
“Kremlinologists” who advised the administration.78 
The Administration itself was equally resistant to McCone’s warnings.  On 10 
September, upon finding out that McCone wanted to increase the number of U2 spy plane 
overflights, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy send a memorandum to the 
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR). In this memorandum, Bundy 
demanded to know if “there is anyone involved in the planning of these missions who 
might want to provoke an incident [with Cuba]”. Bundy, who had been criticized for not 
being more active in opposing the Bay of Pigs Invasion, was seeking to ensure that no 
such incident would occur again.79 
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As intelligence of a Soviet buildup began to mount, this reticence continued to 
exist among senior decision makers, informing the reception McCone’s reports received.  
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, on 21 August, hosted a meeting that included Secretary of 
Defense McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and members of the JCS.  During this discussion, 
McCone began to list off the detected Soviet activities in Cuba.  At this point, the CIA 
still believed that Soviet technicians were installing surface-to-air missile systems and 
intelligence collection equipment.  Further, McCone focused on outlining the economic 
situation on the island, arguing that the Soviet Union instead sought to grow Cuba’s 
economy in order to serve as a “model for all dissident groups in Latin America.”  
McCone, during this discussion, listed this information seemingly to galvanize the 
group into more decisive action. In particular, the reports led to McNamara’s advocacy 
for increased intelligence collection, sabotage efforts, and exile group-led irregular 
warfare across Cuba to counteract Soviet assistance to the Castro regime, something 
McCone agreed too, arguing that previous efforts had not been sufficient. 
Bundy and Rusk, however, pushed back against McCone’s assessment again.  
According to both Bundy and Rusk, they assessed that there was a “very definite inter-
relationship between Cuba and other trouble spots, such as Berlin.” Dramatic action, in 
their mind, would lead to “similar actions by the Soviets with respect to our bases and 
numerous missile sites, particularly Turkey and southern Italy.”80 
This discussion demonstrates the internal fault lines within the national security 
leadership of the Kennedy Administration and offers insight into reasons for the reticence 
to react to the increase in intelligence reporting.  Both Rusk and Bundy (claiming to 
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represent the White House's view) were highly concerned that any overt action could 
trigger another Berlin Crisis.  This concern colored their predispositions and offers 
another reason why intelligence was often not received favorably. 
McCone's absence during September 1962 also shows this rivalry. Once McCone 
was absent, Bundy was able to push for far more limited activities in Cuba, directly 
undoing McCone’s efforts.  Having recently remarried in 1962 McCone opted to go on 
an extended honeymoon with his new wife.  Before this, as demonstrated in earlier 
meetings, McCone was the most forceful advocate for increased intelligence collection in 
Cuba.  In particular, McCone pushed for increased photo reconnaissance over Cuba to 
monitor the Soviet buildup.  Upon leaving, McCone had to rely on Marshall S. Carter, the 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to represent the CIA and its positions, during 
meetings with other officials. 
McCone, though absent, was in communication with Carter via a series of 
telegrams.  Carter, in these telegrams, details the ongoing Soviet activity and reports the 
information that he had shared with the rest of the national security principles. Not 
willing to be rushed, McCone noted that he would “remain [in France] as scheduled” and 
would return at the time originally planned.  During this absence, and despite his desire to 
increase surveillance, U2 overflights were grounded until further notice, ostensibly to 
avoid a diplomatic incident.81 
Upon his return, McCone resumed pushing for increased intelligence collection.  
Starting 4 October, McCone observed that the government had made no progress in 
Cuba. McCone “observed a lack of forward motion due principally to ‘hesitancy’ in 
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government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the 
United States.”  Continuing, McCone argued that “more dynamic action was indicated, 
[and] that hesitancy about overflights must be reconsidered.”  After this exchange, the 
CIA was ordered to draw up plans for new U2 overflights.82 
Exploring counterfactuals in history is a perilous task.  With limited data, it is 
hard to determine with certainty the genuine viability of alternative courses of action.  
Hence, it is hard to assess whether U2 overflights would have continued if McCone had 
opted not to go on his extended honeymoon to France.  Further, even if U2 flights had 
been authorized, it is also not clear if they would have detected missile activity.  
However, what these documents do is demonstrate just how contentious the decision to 
suspect U2 overflights proved to be within the CIA. 
Particularly telling is the memorandum that details the meeting where McGeorge 
Bundy questioned if U2 missions were being planned to provoke an incident.  A 
memorandum to McCone written on 1 March 1963, nearly 7 months after the meeting 
took place, captures this tension. The decision to suspend overflights was significant 
enough that McCone thought it important to reconstruct the conduct of the meeting from 
the memories of the participants half a year after the fact83. 
This contentious relationship between the CIA under McCone and other members 
of the Administration continued as the crisis continued to unfold.  On 5 October, McCone 
met with McGeorge Bundy to discuss the subject of intelligence collection.  McCone 
argued that “restricting U2 overflights had placed the United States Intelligence 
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community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of 
offensive capabilities in Cuba”.  After observing this, McCone argued that the Soviet 
Union would follow its buildup of defensive weapons with the installation of an offensive 
capability “including MRBMs.” Bundy, on the other hand, pushed back against this.  
Arguing that “the Soviets would not go that far” and that if they did it would not 
appreciably alter the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union; 
and that risking a military action over Cuba was "intolerable."84 
As the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates, the challenge of information 
management during escalation control does not end after collecting the information.  The 
analytic biases of the analysts can severely hinder accurate assessments.  Further, the 
managers and senior officials who receive that information, manage its production, and 
pass it along to the decision makers, have great power in controlling the conduct of that 
analysis. Consequently, those decision makers may be forced to judge an adversary 
incorrectly or select the wrong course of action during escalation. 
 
Summary 
 Ensuring that there is a flow of timely and accurate information to decision 
makers is not just a problem of collection.  Once the gathered, the information must be 
analyzed, processed, and passed through a chain of bureaucratic way-stations before it 
arriving a decision maker for action.  In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, one can 
observe those limits bedeviling the process throughout: 
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 Analysts failed to apply proper analytical tradecraft to ensure the assessments 
they were providing to decision makers was, in fact, accurate.  Worse, much of this 
assessment making was done during periods of relative calm.  It is difficult to assess what 
effect placing analysts under prolonged pressure would have had on the quality of 
intelligence assessments, but it is hard to see that impact as being a positive one.  Further, 
these assessments were not being made during an escalation. The Cuban Missile Crisis 
never became conventional military battle, let alone a nuclear one.  These analysts would 
have faced a far more dynamic and uncertain environment once the fog of war descended 
over events. 
Information flow is critical to decision making.  Information, as the saying goes, 
is power.  Yet that same power is essential for managers, policy makers, and executives 
throughout the bureaucracy. By controlling it, those middle managers have a great ability 
to influence events in a manner favorable for their preferred agendas.  The documents 
from the Crisis and the interviews after make it clear that these people sought to serve 
their country to their best ability.  But they served it with the unique personal and 
professional perspectives they brought from their place in the decision chain. Even if the 
agenda was well-intentioned, it was an agenda nonetheless; and during the lead up to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, it was that well-intended infighting that allowed the situation to 
escalate far more extensively than intended. 
Had an escalation control scenario taken place, these analytic failures would have 
provided Kennedy with inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading information, which in turn 
would have meant he was making decisions with that inaccurate information. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, the very process of escalation control relies on a 
 41 
decision maker being able to make the right decision at the right time to achieve conflict 
termination with the outcome most favorable to his or her national interests. If the 
information presented to a decision maker is inaccurate, such successful conflict 
termination becomes far more difficult. 
Take the example of a car traveling down the interstate in the right lane. As this 
car travels, it sees a slow-moving truck ahead, traveling in the same lane. Desiring to 
maintain his or her current speed, the driver opts to move into the left lane to pass. Not 
wanting to be cited for traveling in the left lane, that driver aims to change lanes at the 
last possible moment. To do so, the driver gauges his or her speed to ensure that the car 
does not ram into the back of the fast-approaching truck.  Judging by the cars speed 
indicated on the odometer, and the assessed range to the truck, the driver judges that he or 
she needs to change lanes within ten seconds.  
But what if the indicated speed in the speedometer is incorrect? What if instead of 
traveling at 60 miles-per-hour as indicated the car is, in reality, traveling at 80 or 90 
miles-per-hour? Despite the driver deciding that, according to the data available to him or 
her at the time, should allow the car to pass safely, the car would instead ram into the 
back of the truck. 
It is in this way, then, that analytic failures can cause decision makers, who are 
acting in ways that are seemingly tailor-made to bring about success, can experience 
substandard outcomes.  This is true of statecraft in general and warfare in particular, and 
nuclear escalation control is not uniquely immune to such challenges.  Chapter 5 will 
examine how these same challenges, which we can see during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
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still have relevancy in contemporary information management, and thus contemporary 
nuclear escalation control. 
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4. VULNERABILITIES TO THE COMMAND, CONTROL, 
COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I) INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 All the discussions of assessment systems during the Cuban Missile Crisis are 
built around the structure of an intelligence and communication enterprise that is similar 
to that which exists in peacetime conditions. Those conditions change dramatically 
during wartime conditions, when new interagency and military personnel augment 
existing headquarters and establish new ones. These organizations must learn how to 
function given these changed conditions.  In addition to this, however, battlefield attrition 
has a dramatic effect on organizational effectiveness. 
 Three key categories of facilities critical for the intelligence enterprise are 
vulnerable to enemy attack during escalation control: 
1. Communications infrastructure—all the facilities needed to transmit the 
collected information to analysts, and then pass the analysis to decision 
makers.  
2.  Analysis centers—those facilities needed for intelligence analysts to properly 
analyze both collected information on enemy forces as well as determine the 
status of the nation’s military and civilian populations.  
3.  Command facilities—the locations essential for national decision makers to 
receive intelligence assessments, process them, and use that intelligence to 
determine necessary courses of action.   
 
Communications Infrastructure  
By 1962, the US Government had created several hardened command facilities 
with the intent of providing national leadership the ability to survive a nuclear attack. 
Leaving aside the survivability of these facilities themselves, without the capacity to 
receive new information from the outside world, and without a similar ability to transmit 
both instructions and requests for further information, such survival is essentially 
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negated. Yet the communications tools needed to maintain this connection were 
vulnerable to Soviet attack.  
In 1962, regular terrestrial phone lines and radio links transmitted critical nuclear 
command and control information.  Most radio transmitters were exposed above ground 
and were thus vulnerable to the blast, heat, and overpressure of a nuclear blast.  Most 
civilian communications switchboards were also not hardened, and thus were also 
vulnerable to enemy attack.  In short, even if analysis centers and command centers 
survived a nuclear exchange, there was no guarantee that they would be capable of 
communicating their findings and follow-on orders85. 
Before 1960, little coordination occurred between each military service to attempt 
to ensure interoperability between communication systems.  Each service procured and 
deployed its own communications equipment, and in doing so not only created redundant 
capabilities but also often communicated via media that were totally incompatible with 
those of other services.  It would not be until 12 May 1960 that the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) would attempt to resolve this dysfunction by establishing the 
both the Defense Communications System (DCS) and the Defense Communications 
Agency (DCA)86. 
When the first DCA director, Rear Admiral William D. Irvin, began to take 
charge of the communication system, a massive communications infrastructure had 
sprung up to support each of the major services.  The services owned or leased a 
combined 3.4 million voice channel-miles and 6.9 million teletype channel-miles.  Each 
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of these media passed a massive amount of information, with teletypes alone being 
responsible for 110 million messages a year87. 
One of the first significant challenges facing DCA would directly impact 
communications during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Despite the massive amount of traffic 
traveling across the various services communications networks, the DoD had no manual 
switching facilities to even begin to interconnect them88.  By way of metaphor, each 
services’ communications were like a series of train lines: Each of these lines carried 
trains that had to deliver passengers or cargo to stops that were only serviced by other 
services transit lines. Lacking manual switching stations meant that there was no way to 
transfer one of those trains to the other services lines. The first of these facilities became 
operational in the last month of 196289.  As such, the DCA had no way to tie together the 
disparate communications networks that comprised the DCS. Further, as the name 
implies, these manual switching stations were not automated; they required human 
intervention, dramatically delaying data transmission.  Starting in 1962, the Army would 
begin to automate some of the communications lines leased from commercial vendors.  
However, automation would not truly be integrated into the DCS until 196490. As such, 
not only were communications networks not properly linked, but each of the networks 
was run at the speed of human intervention, which would have significantly slowed the 
flow of the communications traffic essential for escalation control. 
A previously classified 1966 study by the US Air Force summarized the 
vulnerability of this system: Even if the President had successfully evacuated to a 
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hardened relocation site, “[w]idespread destruction of communications and command 
posts would have probably have cut these survivors off from contact with the fighting 
forces. . .  and the nation’s leaders would not have known the outcome of the battle for 
hours, perhaps days, after the last bomb had been dropped.”91 
Leaders within the Pentagon, both civilian and military experts understood this 
vulnerability. In 1960, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) published a 
study it had performed on the survivability of the national command and control system. 
After arguing that “delivery systems and local weapons control capabilities could outlive 
the national political and military command structure,”92 the report went on to state the 
following: 
 
All primary communication nodes for missile and bomber system control are 
vulnerable to direct enemy attack on terminal facilities, including wire systems 
for land-based missile and aircraft, HF systems for airborne aircraft, and VLP 
systems for POLARIS SSBNs.  HF systems are susceptible to nuclear blackout 
effects.  HF and VLF communications to forces deployed outside of CONUS 
(including SAC aircraft under Positive Control and SSBN's) are vulnerable to 
enemy jamming and interference of increasing effectiveness as forces are 
deployed closer to enemy targets93. 
 
After observing this, WSEG’s report went on to point out that a “President could 
not be confident, based on operation experience of exercises, that the whole system 
would work perfectly.”94  Indeed, this system vulnerability was seen as completely 
antithetical to the imperative to maintain absolute control of the US nuclear arsenal.  The 
problem was not just one of the President or another surviving official being able to 
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communicate with the US nuclear force.  The breakdown of communications also 
highlights the problem of determining who in the line of succession survived the attack, 
along with the possibility that a comparatively junior official in the line of succession 
could end up assuming control of the nuclear force over another senior official because 
that junior official happened to gain a reliable communications link first.  As the report 
argues, “the possibility exists that the man to wield presidential authority in a dire 
emergency might in fact be selected by a single field grade military officer” who happens 
to answer the phone95.  Such a determination makes no determination of the suitability of 
that official to take command, nor does it ensure that that official would be sufficiently 
aware of the situation to control nuclear forces effectively. 
The Kennedy Administration recognized these flaws from its outset. Yet, due to 
the limitations of the appropriations cycle during the 1960s, the first fiscal year the DoD 
could begin rolling out significant changes was not in time for the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
As such, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the communications infrastructure was 
inefficient, vulnerable, not properly administered; and the personnel running the system 
would likely have struggled to merely properly maintain situational awareness for 
whomever in the line of succession survived, let alone provide reliable links for that 
successor to the military forces.  
 
Analysis Centers 
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, many key intelligence facilities were in close 
proximity to the national capital, including: 
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● The Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia 
● The National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland 
● The Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington Hall, Virginia 
 
These three facilities were essential intelligence analysis centers.  Despite the 
threat to Washington, D.C. they all remained within 20 miles of the capital.  Such 
proximity is the result of political factors, both in Congress and within the executive 
branch, which left the US Government’s analytical facilities exposed during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Starting in 1950, the US Government began a program of relocation, 
intended to move as many as 40,000 essential government agencies away from the 
District of Columbia and its outskirts to locations 50 miles away from the District. 
Relocated facilities could not be any closer than 10 miles from the capital96.  
Almost immediately, this process was met with opposition by both members of 
Congress and federal employees themselves.  One US representative proposed protecting 
40,000 “government bureaucrats” by simply eliminating 40,000 federal jobs. Another 
demanded to know how the President could propose to protect 40,000 civilian employees 
while US service members were fighting in Korea97. 
The government employees selected for relocation also balked. Many of these 
civil servants resented the idea of moving out from their comfortable lives in the District 
of Columbia to comparatively rural and less developed suburbs.  One government 
consultant estimated that approximately half of the planned employees slated to move 
would resign or retire instead. As such, many of the essential government agencies 
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needed for wartime assessments of both domestic damage levels and of foreign 
intelligence remained in or around the District of Columbia98. 
The CIA was no different.  Having operated since its inception out of 
approximately 40 Second World War-era temporary office buildings, by 1953 CIA 
Director Allen Dulles was anxious to build a new headquarters facility that could house 
all of the CIA’s employees under one roof.  However, Director Dulles also recognized 
and valued the access to national decision makers afforded by the CIA’s centrally-located 
temporary housing. Consequently, Dulles hedged his bets. The new CIA Headquarters 
would be in Langley, Virginia, a mere seven miles from the center of the District of 
Columbia. Dulles chose Langley both because he had enjoyed attending cocktail parties 
at the estates located in the surrounding area while assigned to the Department of State in 
the 1920s and because the location afforded him a short commute to the White House. 99 
In his attempt to remain close to the capital, Dulles was successful. But 
consequently, the Central Intelligence Agency in October 1962 ended up with a facility 
designed to house nearly 10,000 intelligence analysts and support employees well within 
the blast radius of any nuclear weapon targeted on Washington, D.C100.  
The CIA was not the only analysis center that remained dangerously close to the 
capital.  The NSA had been previously at Arlington Hall, Virginia, a short distance away 
from the Pentagon101.  The NSA, recognizing the risk of nuclear attack, began to look for 
a location to house its new headquarters that would be safely distant from the capital.  
NSA officials considered a multitude of potential sites. These included facilities in 
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Colorado, Wyoming, Texas, Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio. More exotic solutions were 
also discussed, including a ship that remained on constant patrol out in the Atlantic 
Ocean102. 
NSA leadership eventually decided to build the new headquarters at Fort Knox, 
Kentucky. This plan immediately faced opposition for two key reasons.  First, like the 
civilian employees of many other agencies, those working for the NSA opposed any 
move that would require relocating from the comfortable environs of the District of 
Columbia.  The initial field survey published by the NSA to address some of the concerns 
NSA employees were already raising stated that “the region is neither a wilderness, nor 
undesirable...any normal Washingtonian can be as comfortable and happy in this area as 
any.”103 
Second, the NSA at the time of the move had a sizable African-American 
workforce, which had worked during World War II in support of Arlington Hall's efforts 
to break German codes. Initially, they had been brought on board to load tapes into 
computer terminals and to scan intercept reports for specific words.  This nucleus of 
African American employees would continue to work at the NSA in increasingly high-
ranking positions through the 1950s and beyond104. However, this minority workforce 
also helped prevent a move to Fort Knox. Any move to Fort Knox would mean these 
employees would have to live in Kentucky—at the time a segregated “Jim Crow” state. A 
survey party attempted to paper over this objection as well, noting that segregation “is 
accomplished without noticeable friction as an accepted principle of long-established 
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social order…[segregation] appears to be no problem for either the whites or the [African 
Americans] native to the area”, even if it would require “adjustments” on the part of 
NSA’s minority employees105.Needless to say, these two factors resulted in extreme 
discontent on the part of the NSA’s employees.   
Given that these employees had very rare skills that were difficult to locate, these 
objections soon resulted in the NSA’s being directed to build its new headquarters in Fort 
Meade, Maryland in February, 1952.  The new headquarters would be completed in 
1957106. Though Fort Meade was still relatively close to Washington, and even closer 
proximity to Baltimore, security considerations took a back seat to workforce 
considerations. Thus, the NSA headquarters was actually out of the damage radius of a 
Soviet warhead, though a follow-on attack or an errant missile could have easily 
destroyed the above-ground structure. 
The DIA, only recently established at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
occupied the buildings vacated by the NSA upon its move to Fort Meade107. Though 
small, the DIA would provide vital intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Arlington Hall sits approximately 2.5 miles away from the Pentagon.   
All of the agencies responsible for human intelligence and all source analysis 
were all located within the likely blast ring of a Soviet nuclear attack. Due to political and 
workforce considerations, the three key agencies necessary to provide the timely and 
accurate intelligence required to support escalation control would likely be destroyed 
early on after during the outbreak of hostilities. 
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In 1962, however, an even more fundamental problem prevented these 
intelligence agencies from passing intelligence information to decision makers: In the 
event of escalation into actual conflict, President Kennedy and other leaders would have 
most likely moved to hardened command facilities to increase the likelihood that they 
would survive a Soviet nuclear attack. However, it was not until 16 October 1962 that 
Secretary of Defense McNamara would direct the military to properly integrate these 
civilian analysts into communications planning108, and it would not be until 15 July 1963 
that employees from these agencies would become a part of national command posts on a 
full-time basis109. 
A final challenge that reduced the effectiveness of proper analysis centers was the 
prearranged procedures between the DoD and these individual intelligence agencies. In 
the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy complained about the watch 
officers from these organizations who “sit and wait to be told-to be requested to make a 
recommendation”.  Intelligence agencies had watch officers providing some information, 
but they did not readily offer that information to decision makers unless they were 
directed to provide it110.   
In February 1963, the Anzoategui Affair further highlighted this problem. The 
MV Anzoategui was a Venezuelan-flagged freighter that was hijacked by Communist 
revolutionaries in Venezuela and steered toward Cuba111. Throughout the event, Kennedy 
was again frustrated at the lack of forthrightness from his intelligence analysts. Writing 
Director McCone after the event later that month McNamara indicated that both he and 
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McCone had “agreed to have members of [DoDs] staff get together [with CIA’s staff] 
and work out detailed procedures to effect better and closer coordination of emergency 
actions requiring quick reaction.”112 
In short, during the Cuban Missile Crisis the analytical centers essential to 
informing President Kennedy should the crisis have escalated into a conventional or 
nuclear conflict were vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack. Further, these centers were not 
properly tied into the national military communications networks and did not have 
habitual working relationships with the command centers in which the President and his 
advisors would work. 
The DoD also understood this vulnerability at the time of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. In reflecting on the vulnerabilities that plagued the US Government as it entered 
the 1960, the WSEG wrote that “installations, such as damage assessment centers, whose 
capabilities are needed by command in the period after the initial strikes would be less 
certain of destruction in the initial attacks if they were not collocated with important 
primary targets that an enemy must include in his counterforce attacks.”113  
Yet this was not the case.  In the event of an escalation control scenario, the 
analysis centers remained in large and above-ground facilities close to the Soviet Union's 
most likely target.  These centers also lacked properly established and formal working 
relationships necessary for passing critical information.  Finally, analytical centers also 
lacked physical representation at the (notionally) survivable relocation sites where 
President Kennedy or his successor would have sheltered during an attack.  In short, if 
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escalation control requires the flow of timely and accurate information to decision 
makers, the US intelligence community was not postured to do so in 1962. 
 
Command Facilities 
Broadly speaking, command facilities have the following key tasks, which take 
place both in peacetime and in crisis: 
 
● Situation Monitoring. Command centers, as a matter of course, “must monitor 
strategic intelligence, both from classified means and from open sources, for 
indicators”114 that an attack or strategically significant event is underway. 
Though the actual analysis and production portion for this intelligence support 
occur at analysis centers, command centers are a major consumer of those 
reports. Further, as a conflict escalates, the personnel assigned to a command 
center may have to begin performing their own analyses as individual analysis 
centers are forced offline due to enemy action or other post-attack disruptions. 
● Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (TW/AA). Closely linked but 
distinct from situation monitoring, command centers must verify if an attack is 
underway. If an attack were determined to be in progress, command centers 
must also determine its strength, composition, and probable targets.  While 
analytical centers, at least at the outset, perform strategic and operational 
warning, it is the command centers that are responsible for generating tactical 
warning.115   
● Decision Making. Command facilities must provide decision makers—in this 
case President Kennedy—with the ability to receive input from analysis 
centers, digest that analysis, and confer with the key advisers such as the JCS 
and other cabinet-level officials.   
● Force Management. Facilitating situation awareness is an essential function of 
command nodes.  This awareness must be not just of the enemy situation but 
also of the disposition of friendly forces.  Such knowledge creates a “common 
operating picture” (COP) that decision makers and military commanders can 
use to determine what military assets (bombers, ICBMs, missile submarines, 
etc.) are available during escalation. If that escalation takes place post-attack, 
command centers determine which forces survived the attack and what 
capabilities they still possess.  For example, an ICBM site might survive an 
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initial attack during escalation but remain unavailable to attack targets until 
repaired.116  
● Force Direction. Escalation control requires the measured employment of 
forces, both conventional and nuclear, against an adversary.  Within a nuclear 
context, it is essential to such measured employment to use “positive control” 
and “negative control.”  Positive control “describes those elements that assure 
instructions to launch nuclear weapons reach the forces and will be carried 
out.”  Negative control, in contrast, consists of “controls designed to prevent 
the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.” Command facilities, then, facilitate 
escalation control by ensuring unity of command. 
 
In 1962, the US government maintained the following major command centers: 
 
● White House Situation Room - White House, Washington, D.C. 
● Joint War Room - Pentagon, Washington, D.C.117 
● Mount Weather - Blue Ridge Mountains, Virginia118 
● Strategic Air Command - Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), Omaha, Nebraska119 
● Raven Rock Mountain Complex - Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania120 
● North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) - Cheyenne Mountain, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado121 
● National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)- headquartered at 
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland122 
 
In addition to these facilities, there were several alternate facilities, located at 
Barksdale AFB, Louisiana; Bunker Hill AFB, Indiana (later named Grissom Air Force 
Base): Westover AFB. Massachusetts, and March AFB, California123.  These facilities 
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could replicate some of the facilities that existed at Offutt AFB in the event that enemy 
attack neutralized or destroyed Offutt AFB.   
Additional support squadrons were located at four additional sites: 
 
 Mountain Home AFB, Idaho 
 Lincoln AFB, Nebraska 
 Lockbourne AFB, Ohio (now Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base)  
 Plattsburgh AFB, New York.  
 
These four squadrons could operate smaller airborne command posts flying in 
EB-47L aircraft. Such aircraft had extremely limited capabilities but served as a further 
command-and-control backup. For the purposes of the questions at hand related to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, we will examine three of the most likely facilities where decision-
makers would have taken shelter: The White House Situation Room, Mount Weather, the 
Joint War Room, and Raven Rock Mountain Complex. 
As part of the government’s relocation plans, provisions were made to move 
President Kennedy and his cabinet to a secure location in the event of an attack.  The first 
location, mostly intended to provide some protection in the case of a surprise attack 
before an increase of alert status, was the White House Situation Room, located in a 
bunker directly underneath the West Wing124. In the event of a Soviet attack that occurred 
before the decision to disperse the government, President Kennedy and approximately 50 
other officials were to shelter in this facility, sealed behind 13 separate blast doors125.  
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However, it was highly unlikely President Kennedy would have survived an 
attack if he was sheltering in the White House's bunker. Still, the DoD created a 
contingency plan to recover him post-attack. The plan assumed that a combination of the 
White House's design and the likely location of a nuclear attack made evacuating this 
bunker in a post-attack environment challenging since rubble and debris would obstruct 
the shelter's egress routes. As such, a specialty rescue team, OUTPOST MISSION, was 
assembled at Olmstead Air Force Base in Pennsylvania and was comprised of both 
helicopter pilots and rescue crews. This team would fly to the White House, remove 
rubble and cut through damaged blast doors using acetylene torches, and evacuate the 
survivors to a more secure relocation facility buried deeper into the earth126. 
This bunker was located at Mount Weather, Virginia, referred to at the time as 
HIGHPOINT. It was capable of sheltering 200 personnel from the White House and 
elsewhere to continue to both lead the country and command and control the military 
during a nuclear crisis. The facility was self-sufficient, maintaining its own power and 
water generation, and had a variety of communication systems to connect the President to 
the outside world. That same communications infrastructure was designed to tie President 
Kennedy into the major broadcast networks should he want to address the nation127. 
Another command post, this one intended to support the Secretary of Defense and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the National Military Command Center (NMCC) was the 
primary day-to-day location for military command and control.  The NMCC that was 
operating during the Cuban Missile Crisis was a product of the decisions made during the 
changing strategic landscape of the 1950s. Initially, the Pentagon had no central 
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command and control facility.  The JCS had identified the need for a central command 
post as early as May 1948, but planning moved slowly.  The study recommended the 
establishment of more hardened facilities, but construction moved slowly.128  
The outbreak of the Korean War in 25 June 1950, however, accelerated the 
process.  In an attempt to keep track of all messages flowing in from Korea and Japan, 
JCS officials converted an Air Force briefing room into an emergency command 
center.129 This emergency facility would soon become the Air Force Command Post 
(AFCP), capable of communicating with Air Force units across the globe.  In July 1955, 
the AFCP was designated as also serving as the national command post. Construction of 
the underground Raven Rock Military Complex as an alternate location had begun in 
1951. However, it was assumed any attack on the Pentagon or Washington would come 
from Soviet bombers flying over the North Pole; thus, it was assumed that their slow 
flight time would give personnel at the AFCP time to evacuate to Raven Rock by ground 
or air130. By August 1959, the JCS had finally established the Joint War Room (JWC) 
also within the Pentagon, with plans to facilitate evacuation to Raven Rock during 
crisis.131  
This development process, however, underscores the slowness with which the 
JCS responded to the challenge of Soviet nuclear attack.  The JCS established their first 
command facility in haste at the outbreak of the Korean War.  As time went on and the 
Pentagon became vulnerable, the JCS struggled even to establish their command facility.  
Even once established, it took even further time to recognize that such a vulnerable 
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facility would not have sufficient time to evacuate.  Thus, there is every indication that 
the JWR could very well have been destroyed in an escalation-related attack during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis before relocating its staff to Raven Rock. Accordingly, the JWR 
was expanded in capability and renamed as the NMCC on 1 October 1962132.Raven Rock 
Mountain Complex, or Site R, was designated as the “Alternate Joint Command Center” 
(AJCC), intended to serve as a backup facility for the Pentagon's NMCC. By the time of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Site R was not in full-time operation. A small cadre of 
personnel assigned to the facility on temporary duty would maintain the AJCC and keep 
the site in a “warm standby”. In the event of a crisis that appeared severe enough to 
threaten the destruction of the NMCC, personnel would be flown to the AJCC from the 
NMCC at the Pentagon via helicopter, an approximately 30-minute-long flight.  They 
could also travel to the AJCC by ground, an almost 50-mile drive.133  
Each of these facilities, however, were vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the 
Soviet Union. “Should even a few weapons all on the central high command, the results 
to our retaliatory capabilities could be catastrophic” since “no other target system can 
offer equal potential returns from so few weapons.”134 An analysis within the WSEG 
report detailed that a Soviet strike would only require 6-10 warheads to effectively target 
and destroy the White House, the JWG, Raven Rock, and Mount Weather.  The variance 
in the numbers was purely a function of weapon accuracy: the more accurate the Soviet 
missile system was, the fewer the number of warheads needed to destroy a target 
successfully. “Both the President and the [Secretary of Defense] and [Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff] levels of command are presently subject to operational incapacitation by the same 
events”, the report concluded135. 
 
Continuity of Government 
A further limiting factor affected the utility of each of these three critical site 
categories. The staffing of personnel at these facilities was not guaranteed, further 
reducing the potential utility of these facilities due to staff shortages. Confusion and 
transportation difficulties could have prevented even the small number of personnel at 
these relocation sites from arriving. Other personnel may simply have abandoned their 
post.  The Supreme Court offers a clear example of what could have happened.  Plans for 
the evacuation of Washington D.C. directed that the Supreme Court would shelter with 
President Kennedy at Mount Weather.  As the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren was approached by Federal emergency planners and asked which 
Supreme Court employees should be provided with evacuation passes. These employees 
would be evacuated to relocation facilities. Chief Justice Warren declared that every 
employee down to the elevator operators was “essential”. Upon discovering that no 
provisions existed to evacuate his spouse, Chief Justice Warren declared that he would 
not evacuate to Mount Weather as planned136. Not only is the available space for 
relocation limited, but the people required to man those spaces may not report when 
ordered. This concern for loved ones does not merely affect those who refuse evacuation. 
Provisions existed within Mount Weather to forcibly prevent occupants from leaving in 
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an attempt to determine if their loved ones in the District of Columbia survived the 
attack137. 
 
Summary 
 President Kennedy, or any of his successors, would have faced dramatic practical 
limits on the ability to direct the affairs of government throughout the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  Those practical limits would have likely only gotten worse if the most likely 
target inside the Continental United States—specifically the Washington, D.C. area—had 
been struck with nuclear weapons.   
The doctrine of “Flexible Response” was in its infancy, and the tools required to 
manage it had not evolved.  But even in 1962, the proliferation of nuclear delivery 
systems by the Soviet Union demonstrated that those same problems that plagued the 
Cuban Missile Crisis were likely to continue.  The ability to strike targets within the 
United States made previously invulnerable analytical infrastructure, communications 
systems, and command and control sites highly vulnerable. Though over the intervening 
decades the United States would seek to construct many more of these sites, this 
infrastructure would remain inherently vulnerable. 
The intelligence analysis infrastructure was especially vulnerable. Given the 
requirement to maintain large workforces, the impracticality of hardening their facilities 
to withstand nuclear attack, and the limited space in already costly relocation sites, these 
capabilities would have likely found themselves knocked out early during any nuclear 
attack in, or even around, the National Capitol Region. 
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In Chapter 5, the modern day vulnerability of this same analytic infrastructure 
will be examined to determine if the same challenges remain in a contemporary setting. 
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5. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis provides a wealth of examples of some of the practical 
hurdles that escalation control could likely face in an escalating conflict involving the 
employment or potential employment of nuclear weapons.  Though the United States and 
the Soviet Union avoided entering into a nuclear conflict, the Cold War experience still 
highlights practical problems, which could severely complicate the theoretical constructs 
that underpin escalation control.  These practical problems fall into three broad 
categories, which mirror the categories already examined in the case of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
Because half a century of history has elapsed since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
and the intelligence community, military, and other relevant sectors of the United States 
Government have had five decades in which to internalize the lessons of that crisis, it 
may be easy to dismiss a study of escalation control in the Cuban Missile Crisis as overly 
idiosyncratic. Such a dismissal, however, would be incorrect.  Though much has 
changed, fundamental problems still stand to complicate the neat theory that underpins 
escalation control. By examining more recent history, one can see these same categories 
of problems that existed in 1962 continue to exist today.  Worse, many of these problems 
are more pronounced today than they were in 1962. 
 The information management that decision makers require for is both fragile and 
vulnerable to disruption. Information can be missed, manipulated, or misinterpreted. The 
infrastructure needed to process that information is also finite and highly sensitive to 
battle damage, the flaws that can corrupt the flow of the information required for 
effective decision making can be divided into three broad areas: 
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1. Intelligence collected and forwarded to a decision maker can miss important 
developments, either due to gaps in intelligence collection or due to an 
unmanageably large amount of available information. This can be called 
collection failure.   
2. Information can be misinterpreted, either to inadvertent analytical errors, 
technical failure, or deliberate manipulation in the service of internal agendas. 
These three causes are collectively referred to as analytic bias.  
3.  The physical infrastructure required for information collection is sensitive to 
battle damage. This sensitivity is referred to as the vulnerability of C4I 
infrastructure. This section will examine each of these three limitations and 
how each of these still exists in a modern context.   
 
Collection Failure 
As was discussed in an earlier chapter, there are three key sources of collection 
failure. First, is information volume, namely that the information collected was so 
voluminous as to overwhelm analysts.  Second, is denial and deception, or actions by an 
adversary to obscure much of the signs that a significant movement was underway.  Third 
is, collection error, which can result from the equipment needed for intelligence 
collection malfunctioning, due to either mechanical failure or misuse by its operators.  
Information volume. As stated in the Cunningham Report, the “[information] 
push comes from the collectors themselves, particularly the operations of large, 
indiscriminating technical collection systems.”138 Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
ability for the intelligence community to collect information has grown dramatically.  
This growth in available information has kept pace with similar data growth in the private 
sector. Writing on the subject of data collection in 2008 the Defense Science Board, the 
Department of Defense’s science and technology advisory body observed: “the number 
of images and signal intercepts are well beyond the capacity of the existing analyst 
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community, so there are huge backlogs for translators and image interpreters, and much 
of the collected data are never reviewed….decision makers and intelligence analysts 
[also] have difficulty knowing what information is available.”139   Further, it found that 
“too often sensor integration occurs only when multiple sensors have coincidentally 
(accidentally) collected complementary data, and the results of that collection were 
serendipitously discovered to provide a benefit.140 
The amount of data coming into the US intelligence community is enormous and 
continues to grow. The Rand Corporation, tasked to study the problem of data growth in 
the Navy’s intelligence collection apparatus, found that: 
 
To understand how big “big data” is, think about the volume of information 
contained in the Library of Congress, one of the world’s largest libraries in terms 
of shelf space and number of books. All of the information in the Library of 
Congress could be digitized into 200 terabytes, or 200 trillion bytes. Then 
consider the fact that the Navy currently collects the equivalent of a Library of 
Congress’ worth of data almost every other day.141 
Such information volume has already resulted in the intelligence community 
failing to provide timely warning to US decision makers. In 2008, the Pakistan-based 
terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba was planning a major, spectacular attack in Mumbai— 
India's most populous city.  The attack involved nine gunmen attacking six crowded and 
prominent targets throughout the city with small arms and explosive devices142. Such a 
                                               
139 Intelligence Science Board, Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence, Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, November 
2008 p. 3. 
140 Defense Science Board, p. 41. 
141  Porche, Issac R., III, Bradley Wilson, Eric-Elizabeth Johnson, Shane Tierney, and Evan 
Saltzman. Data Flood: Helping the Navy Address the Rising Tide of Sensor. Santa Monica: Rand 
Corporation, 2014.  
142 Mumbai Massacre. PBS Secrets. November 25, 2009. Accessed November 16, 2016. 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/mumbai-massacre-watch-the-full-episode/536/. 
 66 
terrorist attack is of significant interest to US officials.  Pakistan and India are both 
nuclear powers who have fought multiple wars since the partition of India in 1947. 
According to reporting in the New York Times, the US intelligence community had 
collected large amounts of data, including communications between the attack planners, 
their preparation activities, and even much of their schedule.  And while some 
information was identified, exploited, and shared, much more was missed in the sea of 
available data.  The result was that the attack was able to take place without the US 
intelligence community being able to provide proper warning.143 
The resulting fallout surrounding the attack resulted in Indian troops moving to 
the border with Pakistan to force Pakistan to provide more assistance in curtailing cross-
border terrorism144. Such a movement could have potentially caused an escalation 
between two nuclear powers, a crisis which would have directly involved the US 
Government. 
The rise of smartphones and social media accounts has also created new 
opportunities for intelligence collection.  Open source researchers have used social media 
postings to track military deployments, even clandestine ones, with increasing success. 
Two excellent case studies exist, both involving the tracking of Russian forces.  The first 
involves the undeclared involvement of regular Russian troops in eastern Ukraine.  The 
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second involves tracking the deployment of nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles 
being deployed to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, located on the Baltic Coast. 
I.  On 11 March 2015, researchers working for the website Bellingcat, which 
describes itself as “by and for citizen journalists,” published a study that demonstrated 
conclusive evidence that Russian Ground Forces units had traveled into eastern Ukraine, 
undeclared, and participated in combat operations during the Battle of Debaltseve on 19 
February 2015. Cued onto their possible participation by limited reports coming from 
Moscow purporting to be from a wounded Russian soldier, Bellingcat researchers 
scanned VK, a Russian social media service, for photos that would prove that his unit 
(the 5th Tank Brigade), was in Ukraine. Despite removing the unit identification 
markings from their tanks and fighting vehicles, Bellingcat researchers could use 
distinctive landmarks (such a train station platforms, mountains, and other unique 
architecture) to track the unit's movement. As such, Bellingcat could follow the group 
from its home station in Buryatia, Siberian District to training facilities further west, and 
eventually into Ukraine. The photos then confirmed that the 5th Tank Brigade was 
fighting around Debaltseve. One set of information demonstrated the value of intelligence 
gained from social media. Soldiers in the 5th Tank Brigade kept two Siberian Husky 
puppies as mascots. Using the photos, the journalists could track these dogs and their 
distinctive fur patterns, then geolocate where the photo was taken based on surrounding 
geographic landmarks145. These photos were freely available to any analyst with a laptop 
and an internet connection. 
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II. In this case study, researchers employed at the Middlebury Institute for 
International Studies at Monterey, California, also used social media. Also, making use of 
VK, these researchers used photos taken of conscripts assigned to a unit equipped with 
9K720 "Iskander" SRBMs (NATO designation SS-26 STONE).  Wanting to verify their 
movements to and from Kaliningrad, these researchers began to track the photos that a 
conscript assigned to the unit uploaded onto his VK profile. Of value was a unique item 
that the unit carried while on maneuvers and one that appeared in many of the photos. 
Like many conscript militaries, the Russian army has a tradition of hazing in their 
individual units.  Called dedovshchina, which translates literally to the “Rule of the 
Grandfathers,” this tradition involves newer conscripts enduring abuse from the 
conscripts that are nearing the end of their service. Though this hazing frequently 
involves physical abuse, in the SS-26 unit being tracked, this hazing consisted of 
conscripts carrying around a distinctive suitcase filled with a sizable number of sex toys. 
By tracking these conscripts and their suitcase he was forced to carry, researchers were 
able to confirm deployments of the SS-26 unit to Kaliningrad, as well as some exercise 
locations.  
Researchers were able to ensure that this suitcase was not some another similar-
looking piece of luggage, because the older conscripts required that the bag's couriers 
inventory the sex toys at every location they deployed to as if the bag's contents were 
accountable items.  This research also yielded several insights into the unit's discipline 
and morale: Conscripts at this nuclear unit were growing cannabis plants at their 
barracks146. 
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 These two case studies would appear, at least on the surface, to paint a valuable 
new intelligence collection tool; indeed, they show a way to leverage the ubiquitous 
nature of smartphones and the modern propensity to post photos and personal information 
on the internet. But this tendency cuts both ways. The number of photos uploaded yearly 
will exceed 1.3 trillion in 2017147.  One researcher estimated in 2014 that approximately 
1.8 billion photos are uploaded onto social media each day148. This mass of data only 
adds to the amount of material analysts must search through on a daily basis. As such, 
collection failure due to an excess of information is likely to continue, as the surplus of 
information available to analysts will grow at an exponential rate over time. 
Information Denial and Deception. Denial and deception, particularly by 
Russia, has continued to be a significant constraint to the providing of proper intelligence 
warning to decision makers. The Russian seizure and annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula demonstrate the challenges faced in providing strategic warning for 
contemporary leaders. In 2014 mass protests forced Ukraine's pro-Russian government 
out of power. These protests, known as the Euromaidan Revolution, deposed then-
President Viktor Yanukovych and brought a new, pro-western Ukrainian government into 
power.  In response, Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula, which housed the Russian 
Navy’s most significant Black Sea naval facilities149. 
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Russia did not seize the Crimean Peninsula through overt military action.  Instead, 
groups of armed Soldiers, lacking proper national or unit identification, began appearing 
across the Crimean Peninsula. These “Little Green Men” as they were referred to in 
western media quickly seized control of government buildings, Ukrainian military bases, 
and other key infrastructure across Crimea. Referred to by the Russian media as "self-
defense militias," these groups claimed to be spontaneous uprisings of angry residents 
who claimed to be defending themselves against a supposedly fascist government that 
had taken power in Kiev150. These groups then began to support rebel groups that had 
arisen in Ukraine's ethnically Russian Donetsk and Luhansk regions151.The non-
attributional nature of these fighters delayed the United States and other NATO powers 
from being able to identify these units as Russian.  By the time the United States and 
NATO were willing to publicly agree that the Little Green Men were, in fact, Russian 
troops, Crimea was under the control of Russian forces152.  
These tactics followed an emerging Russian unconventional warfare technique 
called the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” named after the Russian Chief of the General Staff 
during the Ukraine Crisis. Gerasimov detailed many of the same tactics used in Ukraine 
in an article he published in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (VPK) (Military-Industrial 
Courier), entitled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand 
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations.” Though 
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Gerasimov himself cautions that every conflict is different and, as such, no one-size-fits-
all approach is possible, Gerasimov argues that “indirect and asymmetric methods” are 
required to counter supposed western interventions that take place under the guise of 
Ukrainian-style “color revolutions.”153 Scholars such as Michael Kofman have researched 
this concept and has raised doubts if such tactics constitute a formal doctrine.  Many 
armies, he argues, use similar tactics.  Just because an entire Russian unit takes off their 
identifying patches, he argues, does not mean that they have suddenly become a special 
hybrid unit. But regardless if Gerasimov’s ideas have been adopted as formal doctrine, 
the discussion surrounding them identify the challenge covert military action causes in 
NATO Alliance decision making.154NATO circles fear the use of these tactics in the 
Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All three of these countries have 
ethnically Russian populations as Ukraine does.  Further, such an effort to seize terrain by 
similar covert means would allow Russia to both subvert NATO and create a land-bridge 
to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Coast155.  Should such an effort occur, US 
collection could be slow to confirm the effort is being Russian-led until the only methods 
remaining to the United States is a conventional conflict which risks a nuclear escalation 
with Russia’s nuclear forces. 
Collection failure. Collection error remains a significant potential vulnerability 
during future escalation control scenarios. Given that discussions of the characteristics of 
                                               
153 Bartles, Charles K. "Getting Gerasimov Right." Military Review, January 1, 2016. 
154 Kofman, Michael. "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts." War on the Rocks. 
March 11, 2016. Accessed December 11, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-
hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.  
155 Person, Robert. "6 Reasons Not to Worry about Russia Invading the Baltics." The 
Washington Post, November 12, 2015. Accessed November 17, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/12/6-reasons-not-to-worry-
about-russia-invading-the-baltics/. 
 72 
contemporary collection systems could compromise sources and methods, much of the 
information surrounding system effectiveness remains classified and thus largely 
unavailable. However, there are two current collection assets that have publicly available 
data detailing system shortcomings: the JLENS and DCGS-A.  
The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS) was designed to detect incoming cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft.  JLENS 
is an aerostat or a tethered lighter-than-air balloon, which aims to provide persistent top-
down surveillance for upwards of 30 days at a time. In addition to providing early 
warning of an incoming enemy cruise missile system, JLENS was also designed to 
provide the fire control information needed for air defense sites and interceptors to 
engage and destroy the missile before it reached its target156.  The proliferation of foreign 
cruise missile systems designed by Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China 
prompted this system. Cruise missiles, due to their low thermal signature, small size, and 
low flight altitude, are exceedingly difficult to detect with conventional ground-based 
radars or satellite157. 
The JLENS program, however, was beset with serious issues from its outset. 
JLENS was unable to provide 30 days of continuous coverage as intended, requiring 
frequent idle periods due to technical failure. The system proved especially vulnerable to 
weather, a problem that doomed one JLENS deployed at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Maryland’s Edgewood Area. High winds on 29 October 2015 caused the JLENS to break 
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free of its tether and drift over 240km before crashing in rural Pennsylvania158.  This 
failure was due to a depleted battery that rendered the auto-deflate feature on the JLENS 
inoperable159.  
Worse, the JLENS also had digital communications issues. Auditors found that 
the JLENS’s fire control systems were incapable of differentiating between friendly and 
enemy targets.  Those same systems struggled to maintain communications with the 
overall national air defense network. JLENS also failed in real world scenarios to detect 
the very systems against which it was designed to defend. Auditors discovered that the 
JLENS “had certain features incorporated into its software intended to deal with the very 
high target densities that exist. However, the design approach chosen to deal with this 
problem resulted in certain target sets being excluded by the software algorithms 
associated with the surveillance radar. This could result in some high-priority radar 
targets not being processed and tracked.”160 On 15 April 2015, a postal worker was able 
to fly over the capital in a low-flying rotary wing aircraft, despite JLENS being 
specifically designed to detect objects flying in that flight profile161. 
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JLENS remains in development, and is still intended for fielding to defend the 
National Capital Region as of this writing.162.  However, the failings already 
demonstrated by this system demonstrate the enduring challenge of collection error in the 
contemporary environment, one which has real implication for future escalation control 
scenarios. An unreliable warning system like JLENS could cause decision makers to opt 
to escalate due to a concern that an attack could go undetected and thus prevent them 
from being able to issue commands to US forces. 
Another example of collection failure is the Department of Defense’s Distributed 
Common Ground System-Army, or “DCGS-A.” This system, as described by the 
Department of the Army, is an “intelligence program that enables operational 
visualization, situational awareness, current and future operations.”163 In short, DCGS-A 
is intended as a multi-service intelligence processing system. It is designed to take 
collection data, combine it with existing data that is stored on central servers, and “fuse” 
that information into products that can be used to better understand the operational 
environment. “DCGS-A provides Commanders the ability to track and task battle-space 
sensors and receive intelligence information from multiple sources, and will facilitate 
‘Seeing’ and ‘Knowing’ on the battlefield.”164 
DCGS-A has demonstrated significant problems in accomplishing this mission, 
however. The system, as it was fielded, was met with persistent criticisms from its users.  
A report from November 2013 commented that DCGS-A was “unstable, slow, not 
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friendly and a major hindrance to operations,” with units complaining that DCGS-A 
upgrades would delete all data saved on the systems. Even worse, these same persistent 
problems would result in DCGS-A not working for 5 calendar days every month due to 
repair and maintenance requirements165.  
These problems continued throughout the systems rollout. In one 2014 incident, 
units operating DCGS-A observed that the system continued to be unreliable. In one case, 
10 hours of targeting analysis necessary for an attack was deleted permanently due to a 
system malfunction that was no fault of the operators. The system also struggled to 
connect to the necessary databases required to function, failed to search for information 
accurately, and prevented users from being able to navigate between reports 
effectively.166 In short, DCGS-A was failing to properly perform its function analyzing 
collection data. 
On 3 October 2015, Army Special Forces operating inside Kunduz, Afghanistan 
requested an airstrike against what they believed to be a Taliban position close to their 
position. An AC-130 destroyed the compound, firing over 200 rounds against the target, 
which turned out to be not a Taliban position but rather a hospital run by Doctors Without 
Borders. The ensuing investigation indicated that the AC-130 did not have the database 
that listed hospitals uploaded onto its computers.167 In later investigations, it was 
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determined that DCGS-A was not operational during the period of the strike. One of the 
roles of DCGS-A was to cross-reference intelligence collection feeds and combine them 
with databases of known hospital locations. As such, the AC-130 when departing for its 
mission did not have the information it needed because DCGS-A was offline.168 
One counterargument to these examples is that both JLENS and DCGS-A are 
new, complex, and relatively immature systems that are currently undergoing extensive 
research and development. There are any number of systems in the Department of 
Defense that go through lengthy and problem-filled development cycles before having 
long and valuable service lives. This is undeniably true. However, during the time it takes 
to develop these systems into useful and reliable platforms, those same systems still result 
in collection errors. As the Kunduz strike example demonstrates, those development 
hurdles can have significant consequences, and though systems like DCGS-A may 
eventually become useful and reliable systems, decision makers and the intelligence 
community still must contend with their problems until those systems reach maturity. 
 
Analytic Bias 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, analytic bias can occur in three key ways.  First, 
poor analytic tradecraft results in intelligence information collected being misinterpreted 
or dismissed outright, most often due to preconceptions on the part of intelligence 
analysts.  Second, bureaucratic interference can influence the presentation of information 
to decision makers, occurring when individuals within the government misconstrue 
                                               
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/world/asia/afghanistan-doctors-without-borders-hospital-
strike.html. 
168 http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military/tech/2015/10/21/lawmaker-alleges-key-army-dcgs-
system-down-during-hospital-airstrike/74347222/ 
 77 
intelligence analysis or even outright refuse to accept it as presented, so as to either serve 
a particular political objective or personal bias, or simply because they are unable to 
accept the report’s finding due to their own preconceptions. Third, insufficient 
aggregation of intelligence can present decision makers situational awareness that is 
insufficiently nuanced.  Such a lack of nuance results from overly granular reports given 
in parallel that can fail to provide decision makers with the proper understanding that 
could have been achieved by combining those reports into a more holistic assessment. 
In the time between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the present day, these 
intelligence community has undertaken numerous efforts to improve its analytic 
performance. One example of this is the Team B effort. Desiring a “competitive 
estimate” to determine if CIA assessments of Soviet doctrine were accurate, Team B was 
an effort to bring in outside analysts to review CIA intelligence. Releasing their report in 
1976, Team B argued that indeed the CIA had been too dovish in its assessments of the 
Soviet Union. 
Team B, however, had its issues. To quote a later CIA history examining Team 
B’s effectiveness: 
 
In retrospect, and with the Team B report and records now largely declassified, it 
is possible to see that virtually all of Team B's criticisms of the NIE proved to be wrong. 
On several important specific points it wrongly criticized and "corrected" the official 
estimates, always in the direction of enlarging the impression of danger and threat. For 
example, the range of the Backfire medium bomber was considerably overestimated, and 
the number of Backfires the Soviet Union would acquire by 1984 was overestimated by 
more than 100 percent (estimating 500 when the real figure was 235). … It regarded as 
ominous, rather than reassuring, that no intelligence information had been acquired on 
Soviet development of a nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare capability, again raising 
concerns over a looming threat that did not arise.169 
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Team B, though it had its flaws, showed an interest in ensuring that the 
intelligence community remained objective in its analysis. In the area of strategic 
warning alone, the Central Intelligence Agency undertook five such studies from 1995-
1999 alone170. Yet in spite of this, analytic failure continues to be an issue within the 
intelligence community. While the intelligence community at large attempts to improve 
its analytic tradecraft, it is a discipline that must operate at times with limited 
information. As such, just as analytic failure bedeviled the proper flow of information to 
decision makers during the planning for potential military escalation in Cuba, due both to 
the personal bias of policymakers, analysts, and to faulty assumptions, intelligence is still 
open to errors in analytical thinking, and the flow and use of that intelligence is 
vulnerable to misuse by interested parties attempting to advance specific agendas.   
Three cases in recent years demonstrate enduring analytic bias.  The first is faulty 
assumptions underlying intelligence that helped lead to the 2003 Iraq War.  The second is 
a dispute between Ambassador John Bolton and intelligence analysts within the State 
Department’s intelligence division, over the former’s claims that Cuba maintained an 
active offensive biological weapons program. The third example is that of Ana Montes 
and the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue incident, in which her management of interactions 
between government officials and unofficial diplomatic messengers from Cuba resulted 
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in the Clinton Administration finding its available options to resolve a crisis being limited 
from that crisis’ outset. 
I. Poor analytic tradecraft. Perhaps the best known incident in recent years of 
faulty assumptions leading to inaccurate intelligence reporting used by decision makers 
was the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), produced in December of 2002 
during the lead-up to the Iraq War.  That particular NIE asserted that Iraq “has continued 
its weapons of mass destruction program in defiance of United Nations resolutions and 
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with 
ranges exceeding United Nations restrictions; if left unchecked, it will likely have a 
nuclear weapon during this decade."171 
Intelligence analysts, while preparing this report, used several key assumptions 
into their analysis, assumptions which later proved to be faulty.  These assumptions 
resulted in inaccurate assessments of  the scope of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
program. First, intelligence analysts assumed that since they had failed to correctly 
capture the scale of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs before the 
1991 Gulf War due to the regime's denial and deception programs, any absence of 
evidence must be the result of similar deception efforts.172 Second, intelligence analysts 
assumed that previous assessments were accurate, and then built on those assessments to 
produce future reports. Earlier reports had indicated that Saddam Hussein had a major 
weapons of mass destruction program and so new reporting did the same.  Once that 
initial faulty reporting made it into the assessment, it created the appearance that the 
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analysis was more comprehensive than it was in reality.173 Finally, analysts assumed that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime had a coherent plan for developing weapons of mass 
destruction.  The regime had acquired chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, it had 
continued to produce them during the Gulf War, and after the Gulf War, it appeared to be 
continuing with the chemical weapons program.  Consequently, analysts assumed that 
Saddam Hussein had a coherent plan centered on acquiring weapons of mass destruction, 
when in fact Hussein had no such intentions.174 
One counterargument to this was that Saddam Hussein himself encouraged the 
perception that Iraq maintained a chemical weapons stockpile. If the state in question is 
signaling that it maintains a WMD program, how can analysts be expected to judge 
otherwise. The problem with this counterargument, however, is that state deception 
programs are a common issue faced by intelligence agencies. As discussed in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis example, states will often attempt to conceal their intentions from the eyes 
of intelligence agencies with deliberate deception programs. Indeed, the best deception 
programs are those that present an image to an adversary that an adversary expects to see. 
Consequently, proper analytic tradecraft would have solved this problem. 
In this way, then, one can see how even in contemporary times, and even after 
numerous attempts to improve analytic tradecraft, how faulty assumptions still can 
severely warp intelligence assessments and consequently alter a decision maker's 
perception of a potential adversary.  Further, one also can see how decision maker bias 
can also make the transmittal of accurate information more difficult. 
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II. Bureaucratic interference. In May of 2002, Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton announced that Cuba was 
maintaining an active offensive biological weapons program. “The United States believes 
that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development 
effort,'' Bolton announced, continuing that Cuba had ''provided dual-use biotechnology to 
other rogue states.”175 In response to this, Bush Administration officials announced that 
the United States would tighten sanctions against Cuba.176 
 Soon after this announcement, however, other officials within the Bush 
Administration began to walk back this statement. When interviewed at a meeting of 
NATO leaders being held in Iceland, then Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “we 
do believe Cuba has a biological offensive research capability...we didn't say it actually 
had some weapons, but it has the capacity and capability to conduct such research.” 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice clarified further, stating “'you can't show 
someone a biotech lab and be assured they're not creating weapons of mass destruction. 
That's not how biotech weapons work. And they're actually very easy to conceal and you 
need multiple measures to make certain biotech weapons aren't being developed and 
transferred.”'177  
 In April 2005, nearly three years later, Ambassador Bolton was nominated to 
become the US Ambassador to the United Nations. During his nomination hearings, it 
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was alleged by Christian Westermann and Carl Ford Jr, both from the State Department’s 
Intelligence and Research Division, had testified that Bolton attempted to pressure them 
into changing their intelligence assessments to paint what they viewed was a grimmer 
picture of Cuba's potential biological weapons program. Ford, during testimony to 
Congress, asserted that after Westermann had refused to change Cuban intelligence for 
Bolton, the Ambassador called Westermann into his office and “reamed him a new 
one.”178 
After this incident, Powell opted to visit Intelligence and Research and inform the 
staff there that they were to continue “speak truth to power” in their intelligence 
assessments. Ford, commenting on the incident in Congress, remarked that “There are a 
lot of screamers that work in government. But you don't pull somebody so low down the 
bureaucracy that they are completely defenseless. It's an 800-pound gorilla devouring a 
banana.”179    
A counterargument to this example is that Bolton, while defending himself, 
asserted that he had felt the intelligence assessments on Cuba being produced by 
Intelligence and Research (INR) were “too cautious.” Because he thought they were too 
cautious, and because the threat a biological weapons program would pose, Bolton felt 
that assessment an assessment that identified Cuba as a state maintaining an offensive 
biological weapons program was necessary despite the information having lower than 
normal confidence levels. 
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The problem with this argument is that it still shows how elements within the 
bureaucracy are altering an intelligence product to one particular point of view or 
another. The purpose of this example is not to cast judgment on either of the participants. 
Rather, it is to show that both Bolton and INR cannot both be right. The first option is 
that Cuba actually has a biological weapons program, and that INR has been creating 
inaccurate reports that say the opposite. The second option is that Bolton was incorrect, 
and that Cuba does not have an offensive biological weapons program. In this telling, it is 
Bolton who is attempting to pass along inaccurate intelligence that can influence decision 
makers.  
Again, this does not imply any malign intend on the part of either party. Different 
individuals and organizations view the same sets of information differently.  But only one 
individual group can be right. Further, both offices could be seen to have agendas. In the 
case of INR, their pushback against a more substantive intelligence assessment could be 
seen as an attempt to maintain a degree of independence, or an attempt to impose a more 
robust standard for intelligence assessments. In the case of Bolton, on the other hand, 
either Bolton is attempting to push the administration to take a more hardline position on 
Cuba despite objections within the administration (as evidenced by the immediate 
pushback from both the national security advisor and the secretary of state), or an attempt 
to impose his own standards on INR’s intelligence review process. 
 Another example of distortion case of Ana Montes, a Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) arrested in September 2001 for spying on behalf of the Cubans is 
instructive of how a sufficiently high-placed analyst can seriously influence how national 
decision makers operate during escalation control.  Montes was recruited by Cuban 
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intelligence in 1984 while an employee of the US Justice Department, and upon being 
recruited applied and was accepted by the DIA as an analyst.180  At the time of her arrest, 
Montes was considered to be one of the government's best Cuba analysts,181 earning her 
the nickname within the intelligence community as the “Queen of Cuba.”182  
 On 24 February 1996, Cuban fighter aircraft shot down two private planes flown 
over international waters by Brothers to the Rescue, an aid organization that frequently 
overflew Cuba to drop anti-Castro leaflets.183 After the shoot down occurred, retired 
Admiral Eugene Carroll came forward publicly to claim that while on a visit to Cuba 
sponsored by the Center for Defense Information, a left-leaning defense think-tank, 
representatives from the Cuban government had warned him in advance that the Cuban 
Air Force might shoot down these aircraft should they continue to operate, and stated that 
he passed those warnings to government officials.184   
The result was a public relations crisis for the Clinton Administration.185  Rather 
than public attention being focused on Cuba’s involvement in shooting down of two 
civilian aircraft over international water, the focus was instead on why the Clinton 
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Administration had failed to put a stop to the flights after being told by Cuba that they 
were prepared to take action.186 Carroll’s comment managed, therefore, to badly set back 
the Clinton Administration’s crisis management. 
 Yet for some within the DIA, looking back at the incident in hindsight, the timing 
seemed too neat to be entirely coincidental. Just one day before the shoot down, Cuban 
officials had managed to meet with Carroll, a source known to be critical of US policy 
towards Cuba. The meeting in question had been organized by than Ana Montes, who 
had specially arranged the meeting dates.187 In this respect, then, Montes had arranged for 
Carroll to meet with the Cuban representatives in just enough time to receive a warning 
and pass it along to representatives from the State Department, but without enough time 
for those representatives to actually prevent the flights from happening. 
A counterargument to this example is that Montes could have been unaware of the 
planned attack by the Cuban Air Force, or that the Cuban government could have ordered 
the strike without the intent of using the tour group to tie the Clinton Administration’s 
hands.  While these arguments do have some logic, the weight of evidence points to the 
fact that Cuba had likely chosen the timeline to ensure that there would be insufficient 
warning.  The delegation was informed that standing orders existed to shoot down any 
further BTTR flights violating Cuban Air Space.188 Yet Cuban Intelligence had 
successfully penetrated the BTTR organization, and as such knew of that organization’s 
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planned flight schedule.189 With that information, paired with the standing order to shoot 
down any BTTR planes, Cuba would have likely known the time they were giving those 
representatives was insufficient to prevent the planned flight. 
Given the thaw in relations between the United States and Cuba is relatively 
recent, and given the fact that Cuba’s government has been slow to relax its security 
restrictions, it will likely be some time until additional information about this incident 
will be revealed, this case study shows another potential way that individuals operating 
inside the US government could influence events, consciously or otherwise. 
 
Vulnerable C4I Infrastructure 
As previously mentioned, there are three key categories of facilities critical for the 
intelligence enterprise are vulnerable to enemy attack during on control.  First, collection 
infrastructure are all the facilities needed to properly collect intelligence for decision 
makers. This includes the platforms collecting intelligence themselves, such as 
reconnaissance aircraft or listening stations. Second, analysis centers are those facilities 
needed for intelligence analysts to accurately analyze both collected information on 
enemy forces as well as determine the status of the nation's military and civilian 
populations. Third, command facilities are the locations essential for national decision 
makers to receive intelligence assessments, process them, and use that intelligence to 
determine necessary courses of action.    
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Communications infrastructure. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
United States Government invested significant resources in efforts to improve the DoD's 
communications infrastructure, recognizing that such communications provided 
invaluable command and control of US forces. Government officials also recognized the 
importance of facilitating necessary communications between decision makers and their 
advisors.  Working to adapt US command and control infrastructure in an “evolutionary” 
manner, the DoD and the DCA opted to eliminate redundant communications 
infrastructure and expand the systems that showed the most promise.190 Such steps 
included expanding airborne command and control platforms, as well as developing 
improved links to US embassies and diplomatic outposts in South America and Europe, 
so as to provide the President the ability to consult with US officials located there191. 
As part of this effort, the DoD began to place a greater emphasis on the 
automation of communications.  In 1964, Rand Corporation’s Paul Baran began to write 
about the need for a communication network that ensures communications resiliency 
through the use of “hot potato routing” through a distributed communications 
network,192.he writes, “[e]tremely survivable networks can be built using a moderately 
low redundancy of connectivity level. Redundancy levels on the order of only three 
permit withstanding extremely heaving level attacks with negligible additional loss to 
communications….[T]he redundancy level required to survive even very heavy attacks is 
not great -- on the order of only three or four times that of [baseline].”193 This logical 
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framework, combined with advances in computer processing power, provided the basis 
both for the modern internet as well as more advanced command and control systems.  In 
1969, ARPANet, employing “network redundancy” to compensate for potential 
outages194.  Digital communications technology would allow for the development of 
modern communications networks. 
The current incarnation of the DCA is the Defense Information Systems Agency, 
or (DISA), based at Fort Meade, Maryland. DISA maintains and improves the current 
nuclear command and control system, the Minimum Essential Emergency 
Communications Network (MEECN).  According to DISA, “MEECN is a highly 
survivable communications capability which transmits Nuclear Command and Control 
(NC2) messages and establishes crisis conferences with the President, Vice President, 
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of 
the [Combatant Commands] and to deployed nuclear forces.”  MEECN is composed of 
“C3 assets that provide connectivity from the President to the Secretary of Defense 
through the National Military Command System.”195 MEECN is primarily intended to 
allow the President to exercise command and control of nuclear forces. It is designed to 
support the transmission of orders by the President in a robust enough fashion to survive 
a nuclear attack.  While MEECN mitigates many of the problems associated with 
transmitting nuclear orders to the force that existed in 1962, it is not intended to support 
intelligence collection and the collaboration of US intelligence agencies, nor can it 
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provide robust communications between the President and advisors at sites which lack 
MEECN-connections.  For example, MEECN does not connect the President to all 
members of the cabinet. 
Additionally, much of the nuclear command and control infrastructure is 
becoming increasingly dated. The Strategic Automated Command and Control System, 
which “"coordinates the operational functions of the United States' nuclear forces, such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear bombers, and tanker support aircraft" currently 
runs on a mainframe computer which dates back to the 1970s.196 Pentagon spokeswoman 
Lieutenant Colonel Valerie Henderson, commenting on the current state of the nuclear 
command and control infrastructure to NPR, observed that Modernization across the 
entire Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) enterprise remains 
ongoing."197 This is because much of that infrastructure is extremely outdated.   
An example of this modernization is the development of new nuclear command 
and control facilities to better manage NC3 systems. The US Air Force has begun 
standing up new facilities which are intended to better “provide the technical support to 
help keep the systems running, maintained and modernized.”198 Additionally, the DoD is 
also seeking to field newer, more advanced communication systems that provide more 
resilient communications.  An example of this is the advanced extremely high frequency 
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(AEHF) communications system, which is intended to maintain communication with 
deployed nuclear forces199. These systems are intended to be deployed within the next 
decade.200 
Even so, however, this C4I infrastructure remains vulnerable to attack.  Orbiting 
collection satellites and their downlink stations, in particular, are susceptible to attack by 
a growing number of state actors, to include Russia and China. Development of orbital 
weapons by both the United States and Russia (then the Soviet Union) began in the 1970s 
and has continued today. These weapons would allow either of these two potential 
adversaries the ability to destroy US intelligence collection satellites as well as US 
communication satellites201. Such weapons could also target commercial satellites.  
Approximately 80 to 90 percent of US military communications, to include the 
communication of critical intelligence information, occurs across civilian satellites. An 
adversary would not necessarily have to destroy one of these satellites. The option also 
exists to jam them to prevent their reliably transmitting their traffic.202 
The growth of precision munitions has made targeting vulnerable facilities such 
as satellite downlink stations, control nodes, and data processing facilities vulnerable to 
attack.  China and Russia both have dramatically expanded their land-attack cruise 
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missile (LACM) capabilities, which could allow the targeting of such facilities.  China, 
for instance, has expanded its LACM arsenal to include land-, sea- (both surface and 
subsurface), and air-launched missiles.  Russia too has done so, going so far as to mount 
these missiles in shipping containers to make detecting their launcher far more 
difficult203. 
Cyber warfare such as hacking and denial-of-service attacks have emerged as 
another means to disrupt vital collection communications.  Over the summer of 2015, the 
communications networks of the JCS were compromised by Russian hackers. This 
compromise resulted in their communications being disabled for approximately two 
weeks204.  Similar hacking attacks against both the Department of State and White House 
email networks have also taken place.  China too has continued to launch hacking attacks 
against US government systems. One such cyber-attack targeted approximately 60 
separate networks simultaneously.  Such attacks allow the attacker to obscure their 
identity, further complicating efforts to combat those attacks.  
A counterargument to this is that steps are being taken to protect against cyber-
intrusions and cyber-attacks. In recognition of this threat, the Pentagon in 2016 proposed 
increasing cyber defense spending to approximately $900 million USD205. A emphasis 
has been placed on the surety of the nuclear command and control system.  Since the US 
Air Force has announced that newer missile systems will demonstrate “some level of 
                                               
203 Gormley, Dennis M., Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan. "A Potent Vector: Assessing 
Chinese Cruise Missile Developments." Joint Forces Quarterly, September 2015. 
204 Harris, Shane. The Daily Beast. Accessed November 17, 2016. 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/18/russian-hackers-target-the-pentagon.html. 
205 Gertz, Bill. "China Continuing Cyber Attacks on U.S. Networks." Washington Free Beacon. 
Accessed November 17, 2016. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-continuing-cyber-
attacks-on-u-s-networks/. 
 92 
connectivity to the rest of the warfighting system,”206 a great deal of acquisitions and 
research is focused on procuring defenses to limit the effectiveness of cyber-attacks. The 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been developing 
“blockchains,” currently used to secure virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Equinox, and 
DogeCoin. This technology essentially acts as an “immutable ledger” that reports if any 
given information traveling on the network has been accessed and/or modified207.  
That said, however, blockchains only allow the DoD to determine if somebody 
has accessed or modified data. It doesn’t prevent that person from doing so in the first 
place. In effect, a blockchain acts like a closed-circuit television (CCTV) security system 
in a bank. By using that system, security could determine if somebody has broken into 
the bank and document what, if anything, that person stole. It does not, however, prevent 
that burglar from breaking into the bank in the first place. If an adversary disables an 
essential computer network during a crisis, attribution is only part of the problem. 
Though decision makers will know who is responsible, they’ll also still need to make use 
of that communications network which is now unavailable.   
Why is this so? To return to the bank example, while it’s useful that the bank can 
identify that a burglar forced his or her way into the bank, if the bank was relying on the 
money said burglar stole to operate that next business day then there are additional issues 
with which the CCTV did not help. It is for this reason, then, that nuclear strategist Paul 
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Bracken remarks that “[t]he intersection of cyberwar and nuclear deterrence has 
enormous and widely overlooked implications for stability.”208 
Each of these methods could significantly disrupt communications linkages 
required for the passing of collected information for exploitation by intelligence analysts. 
Such a disruption would complicate the ability of the intelligence community and the US 
military to pass critical information to US decision makers, having a potentially 
destabilizing impact on escalation control.  Worse, these methods of attack are likely as 
part of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) efforts to defeat US forces in conventional 
combat.  In short, the very weapons an adversary can use to prevail in a conventional 
conflict could very much degrade the ability of the US to control a nuclear escalation 
scenario. 
Analysis centers. Today, the intelligence community remains mostly 
concentrated around Washington, D.C. Those facilities are as follows.  
 
● The Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia 
● The National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland 
● The Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, D.C. 
● National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
● Director of National Intelligence, McClean, Virginia 
 
Both the CIA and NSA remain in their previous locations. The DIA has moved to 
Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling just inside the District of Columbia.  At this site, DIA is 
now closer to the Pentagon and the center of the District of Columbia than it was at 
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Arlington Hall, Virginia. In the interim, two additional agencies essential to escalation 
control have since built headquarters near Washington.  The first is the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), responsible for the analysis of overhead 
photography for the intelligence community, to include satellite photography.  The 
second is the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who serves as the President’s 
primary intelligence advisor and oversees the work of the intelligence community. 
 In short, as more members of the intelligence community have merged since 
1962, either as new organizations or the consolidation of pre-existing ones, they have 
remained clustered around the capital. The government has effectively abandoned 
dispersal as a method of protecting high-value targets209. 
 From a practical standpoint, abandoning such efforts made sound financial sense.  
With the number of Soviet missiles growing, and with their accuracy improving to the 
point where the number of warheads required to destroy a target dropped, it was realized 
that few such facilities would survive attack.  Further, starting in 1963, the individual 
intelligence agencies started building more clearly-defined liaison relationships with both 
the hardened and mobile command facilities needed to advise the President or the 
President's designated successor. 
The lack of survivable facilities for the analysis agencies, combined with their 
proximity to Washington, D.C. still means that the vast analytic enterprise required to 
support a President as they attempt to decide the best course of action to take in an 
escalation control scenario remains. The continuing vulnerability of these facilities was 
demonstrated during the September 11th attacks in 2001. 
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During the September 11th (9/11) attacks, the United States intelligence 
community found itself operating out of extremely vulnerable facilities.  The 
consequences of such a vulnerability dramatically impacted the ability of the intelligence 
community to respond to the crisis. The attack struck the north and south World Trade 
Center Towers at 8:46 am and 9:03 am EST respectively.  The Pentagon was hit by a 
third aircraft at approximately 09:45 am EST210. Due to ongoing confusion about the 
number of planes and targets involved, there were serious concerns that a follow-on 
attack was likely. 
At CIA headquarters, the agency's senior leadership opted to meet to discuss 
ongoing events at 9:50 am EST. Of particular concern was information provided by 
Ramzi Yousef, which indicated that the CIA Headquarters as a potential target during the 
planning of the first World Trade Center Bombings in 1993. Within a few minutes of the 
attack starting, the decision was made to evacuate CIA headquarters.211 After making this 
decision, only a small cadre of senior managers inside the CIA remained behind to 
perform intelligence analysis and advise President George W. Bush, which they did at 
3:30 pm.  Though such a communication took place, most of the Agency's personnel 
were unavailable due to the evacuation. 
A similar situation occurred at the DIA. The attack on the Pentagon resulted in the 
deaths of several DIA employees.  As part of the response to this attack, and due to 
similar concerns as those of the CIA, the majority of DIA employees evacuated from 
DIA headquarters. Though some senior staff remained behind, the majority of analysts 
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and support staff at DIA were unable to work until intelligence agencies determined that 
no further attacks were imminent.212 
This same vulnerability was also evidenced further in the future. Over Christmas, 
2003, US intelligence officials believed that an increase of terrorist communications 
meant that an attack on the US, possibly with nuclear weapons, was imminent. 
Accordingly, US government officials began to prepare for the possibility that a nuclear 
attack on Washington could damage or destroy key government facilities213. At the NSA, 
such a fear led then-Director Michael Hayden to contact his counterpart, Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Director David Pepper, to discuss his concerns. 
After the conversation, Hayden observed that while NSA satellite locations could pick up 
much of the slack should Fort Meade be damaged or destroyed, much of the important 
analysis and management would be lost. As such, in the event of such an attack, Hayden 
told Pepper that he would transfer control of the NSA’s collection apparatus to GCHQ 
until such a time as the Agency could reconstitute elsewhere214. 
Each of these examples demonstrates how vulnerable the large, above-ground 
infrastructure are to even conventional attack.  A nuclear attack could have equally 
dramatic consequences, disabling these facilities during a nuclear escalation scenario and 
depriving national decision makers of critical intelligence. 
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Command Facilities. Many national command and facilities remain vulnerable 
today as they did during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
 Fearing that Soviet attacks would threaten the survival of the President, the 
government built 75 Presidential Emergency Facilities (PAFs)  through the 1970s. 
Intended to provide the President or a designated successor a safe location to shelter 
during Crisis, the government funded construction of these facilities out of money 
allocated for the effort hidden within the US Army's budget and directed construction of 
these facilities through the White House Military Office (WHMO).  These facilities 
consisted of a small shelter to house the President and the President’s entourage, and a 
communications suite designed to allow the President to communicate with the outside 
world.215 These facilities were augmented by the mobile command centers that had begun 
to enter operation in 1962.  The President or a designated successor could travel in either 
the National Airborne Command post (NEACP), or travel via ground in a convoy of 
trucks known as the Ground Mobile Command Facility (GMCF). 
 Despite all this, the day-to-day command facilities that afford decision makers the 
greatest capacity for command and control remain at fixed sites and also remain 
vulnerable. And the attacks on 9/11 also provide a case study involving the National 
Military Command Center (NMCC) that demonstrates this fact.  At 9:37 EST, American 
Flight 77216 crashed into the Pentagon’s western side. The aircraft traveled through the 
first floor of the building and penetrated the building’s E- and D-Rings (the outermost 
and second outermost rings), with the remains of the aircraft stopping just short of C-
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Ring217. The impact of Flight 77 immediately started fires throughout the Pentagon 
complex.  Though the NMCC was located under the other side of the Pentagon, the 
building’s interconnected support systems such as air processing, temperature control, 
and power were connected to the same system.  As the fires continued to burn in the 
western side, these systems began to fail within the NMCC.  Had there not been 
significant intervention from the Pentagon’s support staff, the NMCC would have been 
forced offline218. 
Continuity of Government. Continuity of government also remains a challenge 
for the US Government.  In the wake of 9/11, a renewed emphasis was placed on 
continuity-of-government exercises to prepare for potential attacks on the national 
capital. In the weeks following the attacks, essential personnel remained at offsite 
locations such as Site R for several weeks until the determination was made that no 
further attacks were likely.219 In the ensuing decade, the Federal Government ran many 
continuity-of-government exercises.  These exercises, however, demonstrated that there 
were still serious flaws in government readiness. One study by the Government 
Accountability Office audited continuity-of-government exercises by different federal 
agencies.  They found deficiencies in these preparations, including an inability to validate 
that continuity-of-government sites would even have the necessary infrastructure, such as 
power, to function. It also found that much of the preparation for continuity-of-
government remained on paper and was not fully exercised with the rigor needed in a 
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nuclear environment220.  Another Government Accountability Office study determined 
that the Defense Department remained unready to provide support to continuity-of-
government and civil response activities that would be essential to continue government 
operations221. 
 
Summary 
 In discussions of escalation control, an enormous amount of attention is paid to 
the survivability of nuclear forces, of civil targets, and of key strategic resources.  Part of 
this is likely a legacy of the earliest nuclear weapons.  In a world of massive retaliation, 
the need for nuanced assessments realistically extended no further than assessing what 
targets required re-attack. As nuclear strategy has evolved, so too has the need to provide 
timely, accurate, unbiased, and persistent intelligence updates.   
In the modern era, decision makers have inherited an information management 
enterprise that retains many of the shortcomings of previous generations.  Bias still enters 
the system. Denial and deception remain an issue.  Information volume has grown 
exponentially every year since 1962, without a corresponding growth in tools to manage 
that growth. Worse, the more capable near-peer nuclear forces become, the few 
techniques available to protect the assets required to make such assessments have further 
declined in utility. 
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In short, the dynamics from the Cuban Missile Crisis remain in place.  The 
practical limits remain, thus potentially depriving decision makers with the information 
they need.  And without that, escalation control becomes much harder to manage.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 Nuclear escalation control, as a concept, attempts to avert a total and uncontrolled 
nuclear exchange. To do so, it relies on a decision maker choosing limited targeting 
options based on the situation that could compel an adversary to accept conflict 
termination terms that are favorable to that decision maker’s national interests. 
 Such decision making, however, requires accurate information, in order to 
determine how much damage an adversary has taken, as well as to determine the damage 
his or her own forces. Yet the fog of war is as much a part of nuclear escalation control as 
it is conventional conflict. The information that a decision maker receives will often be 
incomplete, can be inaccurate, and can degrade as the conflict continues. 
As we have seen, information management during the Cuban Missile Crisis was 
extremely challenging and deeply flawed, due to three principle shortcomings: collection 
failures, analytic bias, and vulnerabilities to the command, control, communications, and 
intelligence (C4I) infrastructure. These challenges all would have contributed to the “fog” 
President Kennedy would have been forced to peer through to determine which best 
course of action to take to terminate the conflict on favorable terms. 
Failures in collection, driven by the sheer volume of information, robust denial 
and deception efforts by an adversary, or technical error on the part of any number of 
collection platforms can all result in incomplete or inaccurate information being 
processed by the intelligence community. An intelligence community cannot exploit 
information that it cannot see, and poor information provided to the intelligence 
community will in turn result in poor intelligence. 
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The intelligence community, then, would have processed that information. 
However, this analytical process was itself vulnerable to analytic bias.  Poor analytic 
tradecraft and bureaucratic interference both distorted the information being provided to 
President Kennedy. Even if collection efforts had been perfect, this analytic bias would 
have likely resulted in distorted information being presented to Kennedy, as it was at 
numerous points before and during the crisis. 
Finally, the command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure 
necessary for this collection, analysis, and transmission to Kennedy, as well as the 
infrastructure needed to transmit Kennedy’s instructions once he decided to act, were 
extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. The communications infrastructure, the analytic 
facilities, and the command facilities were both finite in number and vulnerable to even a 
few nuclear weapons. 
But even over the intervening decades, these issues persist. In examining 
numerous contemporary (or near contemporary) case studies, we can see how the same 
issues bedevil information management today. In particular, the vulnerability of 
continuity-of-government in the face of nuclear attack, persists.  The institutional and 
bureaucratic pressures that prevented proper dispersal have not disappeared; indeed, the 
number of intelligence agencies headquartered in Washington D.C. has only grown.  
Ironically, this construction may result in dispersal simply because there are no more 
facilities left available in or around the District of Columbia.   
An example of this would be the US Army's Cyber Operations Center, in 
Augusta, Georgia.  However, given the number of nuclear delivery systems and warheads 
available to a near-peer adversary, this dispersal concept is likely obsolete. These 
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agencies could create more hardened facilities, but cost precludes building these facilities 
in a quantity or quality that is likely to serve the number and accuracy of modern nuclear 
delivery systems.  Further, the growth in near-peer conventional precision strike systems 
means those adversaries could accomplish the same thing without crossing the nuclear 
threshold and may do so under the guise of conventional warfighting. 
We must remain cognizant of these problems today for this very reason. 
Forecasting the future is a fraught process. As we have seen, such a process is inherently 
vulnerable to any number of analytic failures and biases. That said, perfect collection 
systems, a bias-free analytic process, and totally invulnerable C4I facilities all seem 
outside the realm of possibility.  
Escalation control, at its core, is built around human decision making, yet the fog 
of war, omnipresent throughout history, will not suddenly disappear. But without 
accurate information to use while making that decision, national leaders cannot expect to 
make the best decision possible.  And when it comes to nuclear escalation, such 
suboptimal decisions can have cataclysmic costs. 
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